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FU N C T IO N A L AN D  D Y SFU N C T IO N A L BU R EA U CR A CY  AN D  
T H E IR  IM PA C T O N  E C O N O M IC  D E V E LO P M E N T  
A N D  Q U A LIT Y  O F L IF E
by
O l e g  Z in a m  *
Abstract
Growing complexity, interdepend^i$\prrd'cdynamism of modern life have 
contributed to an unprecedented global rise in number, size and power of 
bureaucratic organizations. Depending on the circumstances they can continue 
to be effective or can decay and degenerate to a point of becoming utterly 
dysfunctional. This article deals with (1) direct and indirect impacts of bureau­
cratic structures on economic wellbeing and overall quality of life; (2) factors 
leading to bureaucratic entropy; (3) distinction between technical efficiency 
and total effectiveness; (4) relationship between quality of life and quality of 
man; and (5) concept of optimal quality of life.
1. Impact of Bureaucracy on the Quality of Life
Limited natural and human resources in any society must be used to 
satisfy human wants. This process leads to attainment of material wellbeing 
one of the most fundamental component parts of the over-all quality of life. 
Whether technology will be fully utilized for this purpose and whether 
individuals’ quality of life will be assigned high priority depends on value- 
systems (ideologies) and preferences of those in control of power. More­
over, between these value-systems and preferences on one hand and socie­
ty’s resources and technology, on the other, stands its organizational and
*  University of Cincinnati, Dept, of Economics, Cincinnati, Ohio (U.S.A.).
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Quality of Life (Tentative QL Index)
1. Economic — material wellbeing;
-t) 2. Political — freedom;
3. Social — social harmony;
4. Moral — justice;
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Two types o f impacts:
I. Indirect------------------------ ►
II. Direct ............
Figure 1. Impact of Organizational and Power Structures on the Use of Technology and 
the Quality of Life
power structure, which affects peoples’ quality of life in a direct and indirect 
manner.
The indirect impact of organizational and power structures is achieved 
through the determination of who has ultimate power to set the socioeco­
nomic priorities of a nation. For example, in a centrally controlled command 
economy, people’s quality of life might be placed at the bottom of leader-
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ship’s preference scale, while in a predominantly market economy of a 
libertarian type, quality of life might be set as the top priority by govern­
ment in accordance with the preferences of its constituents. Organizational 
and power structure also exerts direct influence on such important compo­
nent parts of quality of life as economic and political freedom, social justice, 
human rights and human dignity. Both effects must be assessed before a 
judgement of the total impact of bureaucratic organization on quality of life 
is made.
This article is focused primarily on the properties and characteristics of 
modern organizational structures and their impact on socioeconomic systems 
and their development. Together with ideology and technology, organization 
shapes nations and greatly affects their destiny. In the last century or so, 
organizations have grown in size, complexity, power and importance. It 
would not be an exaggeration to state that we live in a world of expanding 
bureaucracy — a formal and impersonal type of organization — which tends 
to dominate our daily lives. It is important to stress that bureaucracy per se 
is an ethically neutral term. Its effect on society depends on its efficiency, 
on the purpose it serves and on the quality of human beings who run it.
2. Bureaucracy on the March
Bureaucracy can be defined as “a formal organization characterized by 
the rational operation of a hierarchical authority structure and explicit pro­
cedural rules” b It is the most efficient way to organize efforts of a large 
number of people for the attainment of objectives which differ from the 
goals of its individual members. A bureaucratic organization provides a 
system of incentives, rewards and sanctions to induce its members to work 
for organizational objectives. It would not be an exaggeration to state that it 
is among the greatest inventions of all times with about the same signifi­
cance as the discovery of fire, wheel, money and phonetical alphabet. A 
vigorous affirmation of its usefulness would not be needed if the term were 
not used in a derogatory sense. Effective and honest bureaucratic organiza­
tions do exist and whether they behave functionally or dysfunctionally de­
pends on the quality of the people who comprise them, especially their 
leaders.
Change in scale and character of the socioeconomic organizations in 
market economies was caused primarily by the advance of modern technol- 
ology. In Kuznets’ words: 1
1 Encyclopedia of Sociology (1974, p. 30).
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The scale of the plant and the size and life of capital investment required by 
the technology of modern economic growth... forced a shift from personal owner­
ship-management units to the large scale corporations. And when inevitable 
monopolistic tendencies of the latter... required regulation by the government, 
regulation in turn contributed to fixing the nonpersonal organization in these 
industries and... widened the economic role of a government, itself a nonpersonal 
organizational unit2.
The emergence of the Soviet Union after WWI and of a dozen or so 
other command economies after WWII, all of them highly centralized pub­
lic bureaucracies, reinforced the general global trend toward further deper­
sonalization of organizational structures. In command economies on the level 
of the firm, the large size of industrial firms was caused by the “gigantoma- 
nia” of the leaders and a need for reducing the cost of central administration 
by an increase in the size of the units and decrease in their number.
Max Weber was convinced that “the dynamism of the capitalist process 
inevitably resulted in a steady growth of more and more gigantic bureaucrat­
ic structures” 3. Though he believed that bureaucratic organization is one of 
the essential characteristics of modern capitalism, he did not think that it is 
its exclusive property. Bureaucracy is present in any society which is so 
organized that its goals constitute impersonal ends to its members. In his 
view, all socialist policies were “bound to foster bureaucratization and ossifi­
cation of society” 4. According to him, bureaucratic organization is character­
ized by a hierarchical authority structure, clearcut division of labor, a formal 
system of rules and regulations, impersonality toward clients, a specialized 
administrative staff, and a promotion system based on seniority or merit.
Even under the assumption that a bureaucratic organization is manned 
by a group of honest, responsible and dedicated officials, the danger of 
formalism, ossification and rigidity in decision making is very acute. Weber 
was aware of this and was worried by the emergence of ever-more efficient 
and powerful bureaucracies in capitalist economies. He feared that this 
process might lead to a “new iron cage of serfdom”, in which “all forms of 
value-oriented social conduct could be suffocated by the almighty bureaucrat­
ic structure” 5.
Weber disagreed with Marx’s contention that the misery and poverty 
of the masses are caused by private ownership of factors of production and
2 Kuznets (1965, p. 101).
5 Mommsen (1974, p. 107).
4 Ibid., p. 67.
’ Ibid., p. 67.
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by private exploitation of workers by capitalists. In his view, socialism, after 
expropriation of capitalists, would retain expropriation of workers and make 
all of them utterly dependent on the government, itself a huge bureaucratic 
organization. Nationalization of all capital would merely speed up the proc­
ess of bureaucratization. The iron cage of modern industrial labor would 
not be destroyed, but merely reinforced by a further boost toward bureaucra­
tization 6.
Marx saw the demise of capitalism in a process of concentration of 
economic power in fewer and fewer hands of capitalists surviving after the 
devastation caused by overproduction and the declining rate of profit. For 
him, the solution was to expropriate these few remaining capitalists and 
transfer the ownership of capital to the public -  presumably the govern­
ment. After that, the dictatorship of the proletariat would cleanse society 
from the remnants of capitalism and establish a classless society. A by-prod­
uct of this process would be elimination of poverty caused by capitalist 
exploitation. At no time did Marx contemplate the possibility of the emer­
gence of a powerful state capable of a much greater degree of exploitation 
than private capitalists. His implicit assumption of governmental agencies 
selflessly serving society was naive to say the least.
Weber understood that nationalization of all means of production will 
not solve the problem of social injustice, but in all probability aggravate it. 
History was on Weber’s side when he pointed out that “the real cause of 
alienation, not only of working classes but of the great majority of the 
population in modern societies, lay in the emerging bureaucratic structures 
and not so much in the particular modes of the distribution of wealth” 7.
Weber’s views on the future of capitalism were tinted by the fear that 
bureaucracy will tend to reorganize everything according to an “instrumental- 
ly-rational” principle which, carried to the extreme, would endanger all 
forms of individual creative social activities and lead to the ossification of 
social structures 8. In his analysis, Weber stressed the functional aspect of 
bureaucracy as an “ideal type” and did not dwell on the anomalies of 
bureaucratic order which must be taken into account to gain a more realistic 
picture of its impact on technology and quality of life.
In a highly organized society, larger impersonal organizations represent 
a major source of power. Ideally, this power has to be used to attain the 
objectives for which the organization was created. One of the major tasks of 
a bureaucracy is to survive and to continue to perform its functions. To do
6 Ibid., p. 58.
7 Ibid., p. 71.
8 Ibid., p. 102.
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so, “it must act in such a way as to promote the power to act” and to 
enhance its power in the future. An organization operates “as if it were 
animated by the power principle,' even though this is a reflection of the 
behavior of its leading members”. Management must be sure that choices 
made in the present will broaden its freedom of choice in the future 9. If 
organizational behavior switches to the maximization of its power for its 
own sake, then the original goals of organization might be neglected or even 
abandoned and bureaucratic self-aggrandizement will become the order of 
the day with all its negative implications for society. This phenomenon falls 
into the sociological category of “displacement of goals” or “ethicizing of 
means”.
3. Borgs versus Dysborgs
It is only natural that an organization guided by the power principle 
would strive to protect its decision-making processes from the uninformed 
intrusion of outsiders in order to minimize external interference with its 
decisions. Thus the internal dynamics of bureaucracy tends to create a 
closed organization in the service of bureaucrats. As the firm grows, the 
number of stockholders increases and stockholdings tend to disperse. Stock­
holders accept the weakness of their position and tend to become passive, 
while the directors realize that their power is now derived from manage­
ment and not from the stockholders 10.
Large bureaucratic organizations are ruled by impersonal, rationally 
established rules and this is essential in coordinating efforts of large num­
bers of office holders toward the attainment of organizational goals. This 
type of coordination and control provides a certain degree of protection 
from the whims and arbitrary decisions of the supervisors, yet, impersonal­
ity carried to extreme leads to formalism, depersonalization and even aliena­
tion 11.
Bureaucratic organization, in its original and broadest meaning, is a 
means to direct, control and evaluate the efforts of a large number of human 
beings with their divergent personal goals, dreams and aspirations toward 
the attainment of organizational goals. Bureaucracy defines the rights and 
responsibilities of its members and achieves their compliance by establishing 
a system of rewards and sanctions to keep their actions in harmony with
’  Alderson (1957, p. 51).
10 Galbraith (1973, pp. 85, 98).
11 Coser and Rosenberg (1957, p. 134).
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organizational policies formulated by its leaders. Our indebtedness to Web­
er for his deep insight into the nature of bureaucratic organization cannot be 
overemphasized.
Though Weber saw bureaucratic organization as an outstanding feature 
of modern capitalism, he understood that it is not its special feature. It 
exists in any society which is organized in such a manner that its goals 
constitute impersonal ends to participants. Bureaucratic organizations exhib­
it “an inborn, insatiable appetite for more and more formal rationalization” 
and “recognize everything it comes into contact with according to strictly 
‘instrumentally-rational’ principles”. Thus, bureaucracy, based on this princi­
ple, is an inextricable characteristic of modern capitalism which is viewed by 
Weber as “the most efficient form of social organization ever attained in the 
history of mankind” 12.
In this paper the term Borg depicts a functional bureaucratic organiza­
tion, while Dysborg is designated as its opposite — a dysfunctional bureau­
cratic structure. There is not much room in this article to cover all the good 
qualities of Borgs and all shortcomings of Dysborgs. Yet, it is useful to 
mention some of them. Among the good characteristics of Borgs are: Power 
to attain objectives, impersonality, routinization of lower functions, libera­
tion of upper management from administrative details, relative autonomy 
(freedom from external controls), limited responsibility, stability and poten­
tial permanence (“immortality”), rationality, facilitating specialization and 
division of labor, and the channeling of information flows, to name only a 
few. A typical Dysborg exhibits the opposite qualities: Pursuit of power for 
its own sake, clique formation, ritualism, flight from responsibility, ossifica­
tion, risk aversion, preservation of status quo, rationalization, trained inca­
pacity, gigantomania, red tape and many other shortcomings.
4. Technical Efficiency and Total Effectiveness
All human institutions, including ideology, organization and technol­
ogy, can be used functionally, in the sense of serving the purposes they are 
supposed to serve to promote socioeconomic development, or dysfunctional- 
ly — in a manner hampering this development. From the point of view of 
purely technical efficiency as well as overall effectiveness, all bureaucracies 
can be placed on a scale (spectrum) between two poles representing “pure 
types” designated as Borgs (functional bureaucratic organizations) and Dys-
12 Mommsen (1974, p. 64).
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borgs (dysfunctional bureaucratic organizations). The degree of purely tech­
nical efficiency will determine the relative position of a given bureaucracy 
on this scale. If one includes an evaluation of the organizational goals 
themselves, the classification becomes more complex. The addition of anoth­
er (vertical) scale superimposed on the efficiency scale (horizontal), repre­
senting an ethical evaluation of organizational objectives, results in a four­
fold classification of organizational effectiveness or bureaucracies (see Fig­
ure 2).
“ G o o d ”  G oals
Figure 2. Technical Efficiency versus Overall Effectiveness of Borgs and Dysborgs
The Borg-Dysborg relationship is depicted by a horizontal axis, while 
the ethically desirable versus ethically undesirable objectives pursued by 
bureaucracies are placed on a vertical axis. The intersection of these two 
axes leads to the following four-fold classification: Quadrant I -  Borg pursu­
ing desirable goals; Quadrant II -  desirable goals pursued inefficiently by a 
Dysborg; Quadrant III — undesirable goals advanced in an inefficient man­
ner by a Dysborg; and Quadrant IV -  Borg pursuing undesirable goals. On
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a scale of overall effectiveness these quadrants are lined up in order of their 
social desirability. It must be pointed out that, depending on the desirability 
of objectives pursued, Borgs and Dysborgs can either enhance or hamper the 
process of development.
Some examples might illustrate the usefulness of this classification. In 
quadrant III one could place the Soviet government pursuing goals detrimen­
tal to the quality of life of the Soviet people with considerable inefficiency 
— a case of Dysborg in pursuit of “bad” goals. This could be viewed as a 
blessing, while an extremely “efficient” Borg in charge of extermination of 
those who oppose a totalitarian regime (Quadrant IV) is an abomination. 
Thus not all Borgs are good and Dysborgs bad. In a libertarian market-ori­
ented economy, well-run Borgs are a definite blessing (Quadrant I), while 
negative aspects of private and public Dysborgs, most dramatically evident 
in some LDCs, can hamper economic development and turn a potential 
economic advance into an economic crisis, stagnation and misery (Quadrant 
II) 13.
5. Entropy, Displacement of Goals and Power Principle
Since total effectiveness and purely technical efficiency of bureaucra­
cies have a crucial impact on quality of life, and since they have the poten­
tial for both improvement and deterioration, it is useful to throw some light 
on a few causal factors leading to these changes. A theory of social change 
based on necessary and sufficient conditions — a coincidence of power and 
will — and a theory of discontent suggest that technical efficiency of a 
bureaucracy and its total effectiveness depend to a great extent on the 
quality of the management (people) running it. But assuming that the qual­
ity of managers is constant, are there any factors which will eventually lead 
to its deterioration? If nothing is done about it, does a Borg tend to 
degenerate into a Dysborg?
If a bureaucracy is run by “angels” motivated by the most altruistic 
intentions and possessing perfect knowledge and ability to foresee all impli­
cations of their decisions and actions, the Borgs will tend to remain Borgs. 
If intentions are perfectly selfless but perfect insight is lacking, the out­
comes might be contrary to intentions — a social phenomenon named by 
Merton “latent function” in contrast to “manifest function” signifying the 
results in accordance to intentions of a decision-maker 14.
13 Mieczkowski and Zinam (1984).
14 Encyclopedia of Sociology (1974, pp. 154, 164).
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However, if it is assumed that humans are not angels but have a 
potential for both good and mischief, the outcome is uncertain. Yet, if no 
conscious efforts are made to improve the system or to prevent its deteriora­
tion, some impersonal social forces will tend to lead toward the transforma­
tion of Borgs into Dysborgs.
According to the “power principle” already mentioned in previous 
analysis, the bureaucrats tend to act in such a way as to enhance their power 
and to broaden their future range of choices. This principle eventually leads 
to expanding their power for the sake of power 15. Power, instead of being 
used with the legitimate purpose of attaining the objectives of organization 
as a whole, tends to become an instrument of self-aggrandizement of the 
bureaucratic elite. The latter can use this power as a means to achieve their 
own personal objectives.
The power principle is an outstanding example of a social phenomenon 
called “displacement of the goals” or “ethicizing means”. Human beings in 
general, and the bureaucrats in particular, have a general tendency to down­
grade and with time even forget the original objectives or goals for the 
attainment of which their bureaucratic organization was established. Thus 
the means are transformed into an ultimate end to be attained for its own 
sake: Ritual replaces a genuine article of faith; adherence to form replaces 
substance; blind application of an accepted bureaucratic procedure replaces 
a genuine search for enlightened and effective ways of solving organizational 
problems; depersonalization of relationship crowds out their creative efforts 
to apply the rules to serve the needs of clients or employees; blind and 
selfish effort to enhance and expand the power of individual departments 
and bureaus leads to the reduction of overall effectiveness of the bureaucrat­
ic organization as a whole (fallacy of composition) and so on. All these and 
many other anomalies of bureaucratic organizations will tend to develop, 
unless the conscious efforts of high quality people controlling the bureaus 
are directed toward preventing and eliminating their appearance and prolif­
eration.
Organizational anomalies caused by the principle of displacement of 
goals can be considered one of the manifestations of a process called social 
entropy. On the physical level, entropic processes are the transformation of 
“free” energy, primarily produced in nature by photosynthesis, into “bound 
energy. When a piece of coal burns out, it releases free energy leaving 
“bound” energy in the ashes. Social entropy is a process analogous to this 
natural phenomenon. Potentially “free” energy at the disposal of a bureau­
15 Alderson (1957, p. 51).
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cratic organization is spent on purposes serving the bureaucrats themselves 
rather than on the advancement of organizational goals and is thereby con­
verted into “bound” energy. The “free” energy which should have been 
released to initiate and sustain socioeconomic change and technological ad­
vance is lost to society as a whole and transformed into benefits to the 
bureaucrats themselves.
Weber was fully aware of the dysfuntional tendencies in bureaucratic 
organizations and the rise of “even more gigantic and powerful bureaucra­
cies on all levels of social life”. He believed that this process would eventual­
ly bring about a thoroughly ‘goal-oriented’ type of society in which a purely 
instrumental relationship would dominate social conduct everywhere. He 
feared that “rationalization and intellectualization — being the two most 
effective forces in world history — would no longer permit individual creativ­
ity and personal values to play any significant role in social relations”. In his 
view, “the bureaucratization of society will... some day triumph over capital­
ism, in our civilization just as in ancient civilizations” 16.
In contrast to Marx, he thought that “the real cause of the ‘alienation’, 
not only of the working classes, but of the great majority of the population 
in modern societies, lay in the emerging bureaucratic structures and not so 
much in the particular modes of the distribution of wealth” 17 18. Weber was 
deeply concerned with the threats to the rights of man, individual liberties, 
freedom of the press and preservation of the competitive economic order in 
capitalist societies. He was afraid that “some elements were being created 
which would eventually bring about a stagnant society of a bureaucratic 
nature” 1S.
Though pessimistic in his general outlook, he saw some hope in the 
emergence of charismatic leaders whose followers “are willing to make the 
values of the charismatic leaders their own, to do everything in their power 
to reconstruct social reality in accordance with them”. According to Weber, 
charisma, the power of ideas, represents a creative revolutionary force in 
history. It inspires “value-oriented individuals who, by grasping for some­
thing far beyond their reach for ‘other-worldly’ and not day-to-day reasons, 
bring such enormous energies to bear on social reality that the course of 
events is given a new direction,... that the social order is revolutionized” 19. 
Charisma, then, serves as a revitalizing factor or as a negentropic force 
which offsets the entropy leading to stagnation. Yet, Weber did not attempt
16 Mommsen (1974, p. 99).
17 Ibid., p. 71.
18 Ibid., p. 99.
19 Ibid., p. 102.
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to analyze the moral content of the Weltanschauung of charismatic leaders 
who might revitalize bureaucracies and improve their technical efficiency 
while generating a type of revolutionary movement which could lead to the 
destruction of present cultural and moral values of society.
6. Quality of Life and Hierarchy of Needs
The concept of quality of life is extremely complex. In this section of 
the paper the attempt is made to identify and classify some important 
aspects of quality of life and to depict some crucial relationships among 
them. It is important to recognize that they are hierarchically structured. 
Abraham Maslow has done extensive work in constructing a scheme or 
hierarchy of human needs 20.
Economists, in general, attempt to limit their theorizing to human 
wants which are subjective and represent the difference between what hu­
man beings believe they should have and what they actually have. Utility is 
then defined as the ability to satisfy human wants and the conventional 
economic model of consumer behavior describes man as homo oeconomicus 
or economic man who strives to maximize the satisfaction of his wants. 
Subjective wants, treated by economists, have a strong basis in objective 
needs described and classified by Maslow. Yet, knowledge of objective needs 
implies understanding human nature, while human nature, in turn, cannot 
be defined without knowledge of the purpose of human existence and life in 
general. And since the study of human nature and purpose of life are in the 
realms of ethics and metaphysics, one can understand the reluctance of 
economists and other social scientists to get involved in these fields of 
knowledge.
Yet, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is an indispensable contribution to a 
broader and deeper understanding of quality of life. A graphic presentation 
of the component parts of quality of life and their relationship to some 
crucial aspects of the overall development is made in Figure 3. Six basic 
areas of development and corresponding parts of quality of life are pre­
sented: (1) the ecological -  dealing with the safety of our natural environ­
ment; (2) the military — concerned with peace and security; (3) the econom­
ic — stressing human material wellbeing; (4) the social — based on social 
harmony and justice; (5) the political -  dealing with freedom, human rights 
and dignity; and (6) the cultural -  based on the preservation and fostering
20 Maslow (1970, pp. 35, 39, 43, 45, 46).
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of the development of cultural values. This list, of course, is neither com­
plete nor exhaustive, but covers some areas of great importance.
Such classification is useful because it suggests extensive future studies 
of possible complementary and competitive relationships among the listed 
aspects of the component parts of quality of life. If the relationship between 
any two of them is one of substitution or competitiveness, one can develop a 
scheme of trade-offs; if the component parts are complementary, no trade­
offs are possible. For example, freedom and material wellbeing (welfare) 
can, to a certain extent and under some circumstances, be considered compet­
itive “goods” subject to substitution and trade-offs. Yet, if this substitution 
is carried too far, the relationship changes into one of complementarity 
without possibility of further trade-offs.
Figure 3 also suggests that in the area of moral development which 
should lead to ethical perfection, one moves from the component parts of
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quality of life into the study of the quality of man. When the component 
parts of quality of life are analyzed and the relationship among them estab­
lished, one naturally asks the question of what quality of life is desirable. 
This leads to a need for clarifying the concept of optimal quality of life. The 
next step is to ask the question of what ultimate purpose should the attain­
ment of quality of life serve. One possible answer is that all improvements 
in the quality of life should lead to the moral perfection of man.
7. Quality of Life versus Quality of Man
A generally accepted conventional view (contained in most textbooks 
on economic development, comparative economic systems and other areas of 
applied economics concerned with the quality of life) implicitly accepts a 
direct positive relationship between quality of life and quality of man. A 
higher quality of life improves the quality of man in a mutually self-reinforc- 
ing manner. Negatively, deterioration of the quality of life leads inevitably 
to deterioration of the quality of man. As a first, and useful approximation, 
this is acceptable. Yet, there is ample historical evidence and a plausible 
theoretical basis for supporting the possibility of an inverse relationship 
between quality of life and quality of man. A fourfold classification of the 
potential relationship between quality of life and quality of man is depicted 
in Figure 4.
Growing affluence and improvement in conventionally accepted as­
pects of quality of life (mostly economic wellbeing) can contribute to decay 
in the moral values of a society. Some signs of moral “decadence” are 
plaguing highly developed industrialized societies of the West, while some 
oil-rich Arab countries, caught by the powerful impact of immense wealth 
created almost overnight by their exports of “black gold”, feel their cher­
ished cultural values, traditions, mores and customs imperiled and even 
threatened by destruction (Quadrant IV).
On the other hand, a low level of quality of life and the process of its 
decline, might, under specific circumstances, make man stronger and im­
prove his moral qualities. Perhaps the “economic miracles” in Japan, West 
Germany and France after WWII might serve as some approximation to 
this type of reasoning. A possible relationship of this sort, depicted in 
Quadrant II, has also considerable support in numerous religious writings.
The concept of “revolution of rising expectations” is an excellent exam­
ple of almost blind acceptance of the positive relationship between quality 
of life and quality of man depicted in Quadrant I. Presumably all people —
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East and West, North and South — are engulfed by the spirit of this global 
post-WWII revolution. Positively stated, it is a universal belief that all 
human beings have the basic right to expect the attainment of ever higher 
material wellbeing (welfare). In negative terms, the belief can be placed in 
Quadrant III. Poverty corrupts and destroys human dignity. Therefore, all 
human beings have the inherent natural right to some minimum level of 
economic welfare below which human dignity cannot possibly be sustained.
8. The Concept of Optimal Quality of Life
If the ultimate purpose of improving quality of life is moral perfection, 
perfection of man or the gradual ascendance of man toward an ideal state of 
homo humanis (a truly human being, who is humane), then optimal quality 
of life is one which will lead to the attainment of this purpose. This view is, 
of course, based on the Greco-Roman-Judeo-Christian tradition of our 
“Western” civilization and is shared by major religions of the world.
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However, the opposite view, placing man in a completely subordinate 
and even subservient position to the collective, or to society as a whole, can 
be logically sustained and is shared by some leaders of nations in control of 
considerable power. For them, the concept of optimal quality of life might 
take a different meaning and form. Paradoxically, the ideologues and the 
prophets of supremacy of the collective over the individual stress the impor­
tance of creating a new type of man who is completely selfless, altruistic and 
will voluntarily subject himself to the highest value of serving the collective, 
a society of which he is a relatively insignificant part. Efforts to reshape 
human nature and reconstruct it along these lines are exemplified by the 
concept of a new “Soviet man” in the USSR and paralleled by similar efforts 
in communist China and other “communist” countries.
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BUROCRAZIA FUNZIONALE E DI SFUNZIONALE E SUO EFFETTO SUL­
LO SVILUPPO ECONOMICO E LA QUALITÀ DELLA VITA
Questo lavoro tratta delle proprietà e delle caratteristiche delle moderne 
strutture organizzative e dei loro effetti sui sistemi socioeconomici. Insieme alla 
ideologia e alla tecnologia, l’organizzazione dà forma alle nazioni e ne influenza i 
destini. La nostra vita quotidiana tende a esser dominata da burocrazie in espan­
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sione, ossia da un tipo di organizzazione a carattere formale e impersonale.
Le strutture organizzative toccano la vita della gente in modi diretti e in 
modi indiretti. L ’influenza indiretta delle strutture organizzative e di potere viene 
esercitata attraverso la determinazione di chi abbia ultimamente il potere di 
fissare le priorità socioeconomiche di un paese. Ad esempio, in un’economia a 
controllo centrale, può capitare che la qualità della vita del popolo venga posta al 
fondo della scala di priorità dei governanti; al contrario in un’economia prevalente­
mente di mercato di tipo libertario la qualità della vita può divenire obiettivo 
primario quale riflesso delle preferenze dei costituenti. Altre componenti della 
qualità della vita riguardano la libertà politica, la giustizia sociale oltre i diritti 
umani e l’umana dignità.
Tutte le istituzioni umane, includendovi l’ideologia, l’organizzazione e la 
tecnologia, possono venir impiegate funzionalmente (nel senso cioè di servire i 
propositi inerenti) oppure disfunzionalmente (ossia nel senso contrario). Questo 
studio impiega una terminologia particolare per designare i due differenti impie­
ghi: Borgs e Dysborgs. Tra i due poli si situa ogni concreta burocrazia quando la 
si valuta sotto lo stretto profilo dell’efficienza tecnica. Se a questo schema si 
sovrappone una scala verticale a rappresentare una valutazione etica circa gli 
obiettivi delle organizzazioni medesime, si giunge a una quadruplice partizione 
delle strutture organizzative, ossia: 1) Borgs (organizzazioni che perseguono obiet­
tivi desiderabili), 2) obiettivi desiderabili perseguiti mediante organizzazioni ineffi­
cienti o Dysborgs, 3) obiettivi riprovevoli perseguiti inefficientemente, 4) obiettivi 
riprovevoli perseguiti efficientemente. Naturalmente Borgs e Dysborgs possono 
ostacolare o favorire lo sviluppo dell’umanità a seconda della desiderabilità o non 
desiderabilità degli obiettivi. In certi casi la riprovabilità degli obiettivi imposti da 
un governo socialista o altrimenti illiberale può condurre a effetti negativi meno 
gravi per effetto della scarsa efficienza nel perseguire quegli obiettivi: esempi 
vengono qui portati. Si sottolinea inoltre che il concetto di qualità della vita e 
piuttosto complesso: l’aspetto economico ne è solo una parte, che riguarda il 
benessere materiale, mentre altri aspetti sono costituiti dallo stato delle difese 
militari, dalla giustizia sociale, la libertà politica e culturale.
Si studiano infine le multiformi relazioni che intercorrono tra qualità della 
vita e qualità dell’uomo.
.
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TEORIE ASSIOMATICHE E STRATEGICHE DELLA 
CONTRATTAZIONE: RISULTATI COMPARATI
di
P ie r o  T e d e s c h i  *
1. Introduzione
Il problema della contrattazione è uno dei più antichi della teoria 
economica e rimane ancora irrisolto. La prima formulazione rigorosa è dovu­
ta a Edgeworth (1881), la cui soluzione contiene una molteplicità di equili­
bri, come può essere facilmente verificato in una esposizione da libro di 
testo della “scatola di Edgeworth”.
Si sono imboccate due vie differenti per risolvere questo problema. 
Una iniziata da Nash (1950), il quale impose alcune restrizioni assiomatiche 
sul comportamento degli agenti, in base all’assunzione che gli agenti faccia­
no domande nello spazio di utilità. Se le domande dei vari agenti sono 
compatibili, essi ottengono almeno quanto hanno chiesto, mentre se non 
sono compatibili gli agenti ricevono il livello di utilità corrispondente allo 
“status quo”. Il risultato più importante è che se imponiamo sulla soluzione 
la condizione di Pareto-ottimalità, simmetria, indipendenza da alternative 
irrilevanti e da trasformazioni lineari allora vi è un unico equilibrio che è il
N
massimo della funzione II (x, -  4 ) sull’insieme delle allocazioni delle utili-
i =  1
tà possibili, dove N è il numero dei giocatori, xt è l’utilità del giocatore i e dt 
la sua utilità al livello di strategie di minaccia
Anche se queste teorie hanno consentito alcuni progressi nella trattazio­
ne dei problemi della contrattazione, esse hanno alcuni limiti, il maggiore 
dei quali è che tutte le proprietà del gioco non possono essere giustificate
*  Università Bocconi, Milano.
1 Per le definizioni, tutte le proprietà citate, la dimostrazione dell’asserzione riportata nel 
testo e per altri risultati dell’approccio assiomatico rimandiamo a Roth (1979).
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solo in base alla razionalità individuale, né facendo appello a motivazioni 
intuitivamente ragionevoli. La insoddisfazione per questo tipo di approccio è 
stata implicitamente dimostrata per primo dallo stesso Nash (1953), quando 
tentò di giustificare il suo concetto di soluzione come il limite di una serie di 
equilibri di una corrispondente serie di giochi che definì “giochi smussati” 
(“smoothed games”).
Nonostante questa seria limitazione non vi sono state trattazioni del 
problema della contrattazione che potessero portare a proprietà desiderate 
(come la Pareto-ottimalità) e allo stesso tempo fossero rigorose in termini di 
teoria dei giochi, almeno fino al lavoro di Rubinstein (1982). Il suo gioco 
sarà descritto in dettaglio più oltre, ma il problema è di dividere una torta di 
dimensioni unitarie tra due giocatori, i quali devono fare proposte e contro- 
proposte finché non raggiungono un accordo. I due agenti hanno utilità 
trasferibili e sopportano dei costi nel dilazionare l’accordo. Il risultato è che 
questo gioco possiede un equilibrio perfetto Nash e in alcuni casi particolari 
questo equilibrio è unico.
Ci sono stati vari tentativi di generalizzare questo modello, ad esempio 
Binmore (1982). Questo articolo dimostrerà che il gioco di Rubinstein può 
essere, in un certo senso, generalizzato e che un’ampia classe di giochi ha un 
unico equilibrio. Il risultato non è completamente nuovo, ma le dimostrazio­
ni certamente lo sono. La dimostrazione del teorema centrale fa uso della 
teoria dei giochi a orizzonte infinito di Fudenberg-Levine (1983). Questa 
nuova dimostrazione è la più semplice fra quelle presenti nella letteratura, 
ed è costruttiva. Questo significa che siamo in grado di fornire un algoritmo 
per calcolare strategie di equilibrio perfetto con il grado di approssimazione 
desiderato. Questa proprietà è ovviamente molto utile per ogni teoria qualo­
ra s’intenda sottoporla al controllo empirico. Inoltre, essa consente di dimo­
strare facilmente se l’equilibrio perfetto così costruito ha proprietà simili a 
quelle assunte dalla teoria assiomatica della contrattazione di Nash. I risulta­
ti in questione sono che l’equilibrio perfetto del gioco qui descritto soddisfa 
condizioni che possono essere considerate come la generalizzazione naturale 
di alcune delle proprietà imposte da Nash. La necessità di tali generalizzazio­
ni nasce dal fatto che il nostro gioco è dinamico, mentre la teoria assiomatica 
della contrattazione è eminentemente statica.
Le prossime due brevi sezioni saranno riservate rispettivamente alla 
descrizione della teoria dei giochi a orizzonte infinito di Fudenberg-Levine 
(1983), e a presentare il gioco. Nella quarta sezione evidenzieremo le pro­
prietà principali dell’equilibrio e nella quinta forniremo alcuni esempi di 
particolare interesse per la teoria economica.
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2. Equilibri perfetti nei giochi ad orizzonte infinito 2
Dobbiamo introdurre un po’ di notazioni. Forniremo definizioni per 
giochi ad N  persone, anche se successivamente ci occuperemo esclusivamen­
te di giochi a due persone.
Assumiamo che ogni giocatore abbia un insieme di mosse possibili in
ciascun periodo xfr  Quindi lo spazio delle mosse di tutti i giocatori al tem­
ivi .
po t è il prodotto cartesiano: xt =  TI f t. Ora siamo in grado di introdur­
re le seguenti definizioni: una storia del gioco è la sequenza di mosse e 
contro-mosse di tutti gli agenti fino ad un certo punto nel tempo. Perciò una 
storia ha la forma:
xt =  ((*i, x\, ..., < ) ,  ..., (4 »  4 »  •••> XT ))•
In ogni momento di tempo la storia deve essere possibile; cioè Xj 6
T  T
Ht , dove Ht =  n  xr  Sia HT =  xj l’insieme delle storie possibili per 
il giocatore i.
In ogni periodo tutti gli agenti devono scegliere una strategia. Questa 
scelta può essere rappresentata da una applicazione definita nel modo se­
guente:
¿T + i '■ —> * V + i -
L ’insieme delle strategie al tempo T è detto lo spazio delle strategie 
dell’agente i ed è denotato: S1 (T ).
Sia g la strategia seguita da tutti gli agenti. Possiamo definire la funzio­
ne risultato xT (g) come il risultato del gioco quando la storia iniziale è xT e 
successivamente ogni giocatore gioca g.
Finalmente, siano g~‘ le strategie seguite da tutti gli agenti tranne 
l’agente i e ( / ' ,  g ‘) sia la strategia nella quale l’agente i segue la strategia g 
invece di g. Siamo ora in grado di introdurre la seguente:
N
D efinizione  2.1. g* e S (T) =  TI S‘ (7 ) è un equilibrio 6 perfetto/' = 1
(di sotto-gioco) per il gioco troncato in T se per ogni / >  0, storia x, stra­
tegia g e S (T) e giocatore i:
2 In verità il lettore già a conoscenza di Fudenberg-Levine può saltare la presente sezione 
senza perdita di continuità.
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( !)  u, (*, (¿, g* ')) -  ut (xt (g*)) <  e
cioè l’utilità del risultato d’equilibrio di ogni giocatore non può essere miglio­
rata in nessun modo, qualunque sia stata la storia passata, per un valore 
maggiore di e , date le strategie degli altri giocatori. Naturalmente se ponia­
mo e =  0 si ottiene la definizione di equilibrio perfetto.
Possiamo infine enunciare senza dimostrazione il seguente teorema 3:
T e o r e m a  d i F u n d e n b e r g -L e v i n e  (parte B). Se uI sono uniformemente 
continue per una qualche metrica, una condizione necessaria e sufficiente 
affinché g *  sia un equilibrio perfetto in S ( °°  ) è che ci siano sequenze 
e («), T («), e g (n) tali che g («) sia un equilibrio e-perfetto in S (T (»)) e 
al tendere di n ad infinito:
T («) —> oo ; e  («) —» 0 e g («) —»  g*.
3. Descrizione del modello di contrattazione
Ci sono due giocatori, 1 e 2; ognuno possiede una funzione di utilità 
che denoteremo con vt per distinguerla dalla funzione d’utilità attesa denota­
ta con ur  Tale funzione è nota (anche se non è necessariamente la stessa per 
i due giocatori) e soddisfa le seguenti condizioni:
(2i) v, (Xj, x2, t) >  vt (x1; x2, r), per t <  r, x, e Xn
(2ii) lim v, (x1; x2, t) =  bh \b,\ <  ° ° ,  xt e X„
t —> OO
(2iii) vt (.) è limitata per ogni xt e Xt e t,
(2iv) vt (.) è continua in t per ogni x, e Xt, t,
i =  T 2 ,..„  
i =  1, 2,..., 
*' =  1, 2,..., 
i =  1, 2,...,
(2v) per ogni A è possibile trovare un 7] <  1 tale che: 
v, (., t +  A ) <  t] v, (., t) +  (1 -  r]) bn
dove xt è il livello di un insieme di variabili sotto il controllo dell’agente i, 
mentre Xi è un sottoinsieme di uno spazio vettoriale. Le condizioni prece­
denti non sono particolarmente restrittive e non necessitano particolari 
spiegazioni, con l’eccezione della (2v), che implica che possa essere trovato 
un limite inferiore al tasso di decrescita di (.). Notiamo che non stiamo 
assumendo funzioni di utilità rappresentanti lo stesso ordinamento di pre­
3 La dimostrazione è contenuta in Fudenberg-Levine (1983).
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ferenze su X =  Xl x X2 in differenti momenti di tempo, né tantomeno 
funzioni d’utilità trasferibili. In questo senso il modello può essere pensato 
come una generalizzazione di quello di Rubinstein (1982).
Il gioco si svolge nel modo seguente. Al tempo 0 il giocatore 1 fa una 
domanda in termini d’utilità attesa. Il giocatore 2 l’accetta o meno. Se 
l’accetta, il gioco è finito. Altrimenti farà una domanda in termini d’utilità 
attesa dopo un periodo pari a A . Ora è il giocatore 1 che deve o meno 
accettare tale richiesta; se accetta il gioco è terminato; altrimenti dopo un 
periodo pari a A il gioco prosegue come in t =  0. Se non è affermato il 
contrario A è posto uguale a 1. Lo spazio delle strategie in ogni stadio del 
gioco è quindi uguale allo spazio delle utilità attese di ciascun periodo.
4. Proprietà dell’equilibrio
Prima di enunciare il teorema fondamentale circa l’esistenza ed unicità 
dell’equilibrio per il gioco sopra descritto, citiamo alcune proprietà dell’equi­
librio perfetto la cui dimostrazione è molto facile e perciò sarà omessa.
Innanzi tutto se supponiamo che i giocatori possano accordarsi anche 
su funzioni di probabilità congiunte sullo spazio delle mosse possibili in 
ogni momento, allora la frontiera Pareto ottimale in senso forte in termini 
d’utilità attese, ad ogni determinato tempo t, è una funzione continua, decre­
scente e concava. Secondariamente per la (2i), se <2> (uv t) definita per ux e 
[ux (/), «i (/)], denota la frontiera Pareto ottimale in senso forte al tempo t, 
non è possibile che esistano due punti u[, u2 =  0  (u\, t +  A ) per i quali 
valgono simultaneamente le due diseguaglianze: ux >  ux e u2 >  u2. Di più, 
la struttura del gioco è tale per cui, se l’accordo è raggiunto al tempo t, esso 
si troverà sulla frontiera Pareto ottimale corrispondente. Infatti (ad esem­
pio) se il giocatore i fa una domanda in termini della propria utilità attesa, e 
irrazionale per j  accettare senza richiedere per sé il massimo livello d utilità 
attesa compatibile con la domanda di i. Quindi possiamo trattare il gioco 
come se l’insieme delle mosse possibili fosse quello dei punti sulla frontiera 
Pareto ottimale forte. Infine lequilibrio perfetto del gioco non muta per 
trasformazioni affini (lineari) della funzione d’utilità. Per questo motivo 
d’ora in poi normalizzeremo il gioco in modo tale che lo status quo si trovi 
sempre nell’origine.
Per le considerazioni appena svolte sembra naturale trattare separata- 
mente i giochi in cui « [ ( / )  =  0 e $  (ùx (t), t) =  0 per ogni t. Per comodità 
notazionale adotteremo inoltre le seguenti convenzioni:
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(3i) (u2, /) =  0 “ 1 («2, /),
(3ii) &2 («1» t) — 0  (uu t).
Nella figura 1 rappresentiamo gli equilibri perfetti dei giochi troncati al
F igura 1
periodo 4 e 3. Nell’asse verticale abbiamo anche annotato il periodo della 
contrattazione, mentre nell’asse orizzontale abbiamo segnalato quale giocato­
re deve effettuare una proposta. L ’equilibrio del gioco troncato al periodo 4 
è rappresentato dalla linea tratteggiata inferiore, mentre quello troncato al 
periodo 3 da quella superiore. Il loro significato è il seguente: nessun agente 
accetterà in questo periodo un livello d’utilità inferiore a quello che può 
assicurarsi in quello successivo; il giocatore che deve fare una proposta 
sceglierà il più alto livello d’utilità fra quelli che soddisfano il precedente 
vincolo.
È anche possibile dimostrare che questi equilibri sono unici. Si assuma 
per esempio T =  4 e si assuma che la storia passata non abbia condotto ad 
alcun accordo fino a / =  3. Possiamo vedere alla Figura 2 che l’unico 
equilibrio perfetto è (b, 0), poiché punti come c sono impossibili e punti 
come (a, e) non sono equilibri. Infatti non è ottimale per il giocatore 2 
rifiutare allocazioni d’utilità comprese tra 0 ed e, perché al periodo successi­
vo riceve comunque un’utilità nulla. In tal caso non è ottimale per il giocato-
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re 1 domandare meno di b. Siccome in caso di disaccordo in t =  3, il 
risultato è (b, 0), in caso di disaccordo in t — 2, il risultato d’equilibrio non 
può essere che (b, f). Non può essere (a, d) perché se 1 rifiuta può ottenere 
b al periodo successivo. Non può essere {e, c), poiché se non è stato raggiun­
to alcun accordo in t — 2 ed in 3 il giocatore 2 domanda un livello d’utilità 
compreso fra b ed e, la strategia di 1 di rifiutare non sarebbe ottimale. 
Questa argomentazione può essere estesa a tutti i precedenti periodi. Inoltre 
possiamo generalizzare questa procedura ad ogni altro T ed abbiamo che il 
risultato corrispondente all’equilibrio perfetto del gioco per il giocatore 1 è:
(4) «! =  Ì >1 (&2 (••• (0 1 (tf>2 (y> T -  1)> T ~  2 )-)> !)» ° )  =  F (y, T)
dove:
(5) y =  0 se il gioco è troncato in T — 1,
(6) y =  «j (T) se il gioco è troncato in T.
dove T =  2«, n =  1, 2, 3,... .
Possiamo riassumere le precedenti argomentazioni nel seguente:
Lemma 4.1. Ogni gioco troncato di contrattazione possiede un unico equili­
brio il cui risultato per il giocatore 1 è dato da (4) — (6).
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Con argomentazioni molto simili a quelle utilizzate per dimostrare il 
lemma 4.1. è molto facile anche dimostrare che le strategie di equilibrio 
perfetto in S ( °o ) non possono stare al di fuori dell’area tratteggiata della 
Figura 1, ed analogamente per altro T. Se questo è vero, allora ogni sequen­
za convergente di equilibri e  -perfetti deve convergere nella regione compre­
sa fra due equilibri perfetti di due periodi successivi. Quindi se dimostriamo 
che gli equilibri perfetti per i giochi troncati in T ed in T — 1 convergono 
quando T —> °o, abbiamo anche dimostrato sia l’esistenza che l’unicità 
dell’equilibrio in S ( » ) .  Questa è una conseguenza diretta del teorema di 
Fudenberg-Levine.
L emma 4.2. Il gioco qui descritto ha un unico equilibrio se valgono le 
seguenti uguaglianze:
(7) «i (/) =  0  («! (/), t) =  0
D imostrazione. Prima di tutto dobbiamo provare che 0  (.) è uniformemen­
te continua in u. Facciamo riferimento alla Figura 3. Le forme funzionali 
delle tre linee ab, ac e ad sono rispettivamente:
(8) u2 =  a -  c1 uu
(9) «2 =  a -  c2 «!,
(10) u2 =  a -  c} uv
dove:
(11) a >  0, c3 >  c2 >  cx >  0.
Da cui si ricava:
0  (u[) -  0  (u2 ) =  a -  cl u[ -  a +
(12) +  c2 u" <  q  ( « "  -  u ) <  c3 ( « "  -  u[).
Se poniamo:
(13) c, =  («i [t)/0  (0, /)/,
dove i =  1 - 4  (T/2 -  INT (T/2)), cioè i — 1 se t è pari e i — -  1 
altrimenti, per induzione si può facilmente dimostrare:
F («, (T), T ) - F  (0, T) <  n 1 ct « x (T) =  K  (T),/ = 0(1 4 )
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dove F  (*) è stata definita nella (4), T =  2n, n =  1, 2,... Possiamo 
derivare:
(15) K (T) =  K ( T -  2) Cj_2 cr_j («j (T )/«! (T -  2)).
Dalla (2v) e dalla (13) abbiamo:
(16) K (T) <  K (T -  2) rf.
(16) deriva dal fatto che u (/) è la soluzione del problema di programmazio­
ne:
(17) max E  (i> (., /)),
F F
dove u (/) =  (0, t). Il massimo è certamente raggiunto per qualche strategia 
pura, non necessariamente unica. Se l’insieme di strategie pure che risolvono
(17) sono le stesse in T e in T +  1, allora (16) deriva direttamente da (2v). 
Se i due insiemi sono differenti, allora questo significa che per qualche 
punto (Xj, x2) che massimizza ut in T +  1 vale la seguente:
(18) (T +  1) <  7)v, (xu x2, T +  1) <  t)u2 (T).
Infine da (16) possiamo scrivere per induzione:
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(19) V  ct ux (T) <  iftix (0)./ = 0
Quest’ultima ineguaglianza implica che per T —» ° °  il limite della parte 
sinistra della (14) non può essere maggiore di 0. D ’altra parte siccome è 
molto facile dimostrare che F (.) è una funzione non decrescente in y, 
avremo:
(20) F  (0, T) <  F (u (T), T),
quindi il limite della parte sinistra della (14) non può che essere 0. Siccome 
tale argomentazione può essere estesa a tutte le altre strategie di equilibrio 
perfetto in qualsiasi altro punto del tempo, abbiamo dimostrato il lemma. 
Q.E.D.
Annotazione. È evidente che:
(21) F (0, T) <  F ( 0 , T  +  2),
(22) F (« ,(T ), T) >  F («, (T +  2), T +  2).
(20)-(22) implicano che il giocatore che gioca per ultimo gode d’un vantaggio 
contrattuale e può piegare il risultato del gioco in suo favore, ma tale vantaggio 
decresce al crescere di T, il momento di tempo in cui il gioco è troncato.
A questo punto siamo in grado di enunciare il nostro:
Teorema 4.1. Il gioco qui descritto possiede uno ed un solo equilibrio.
D imostrazione. Se vale la (7) il teorema è già stato dimostrato. Prima di 
trattare del caso generale è opportuno dimostrare altri due casi particolari.
a) ux (/) <  0, <P («j (/), t) <  0, per ogni t.
In ogni punto al di fuori deportante positivo un giocatore è senza 
dubbio in condizione peggiore rispetto al punto di disaccordo. E quindi 
certo che le strategie d’equilibrio perfetto non potranno trovarsi in tali punti, 
quindi la dimostrazione può seguire gli stessi passi del lemma precedente.
b) U\ (/) >  0, <P («j (/), t) >  0, per ogni t.
Come al solito forniamo una figura per agevolare la dimostrazione. 
Questa classe di giochi può essere rappresentata, infatti, come in Figura 4.
Possiamo pensare questi giochi come analoghi a quelli discussi al lem­
ma precedente, ad eccezione del fatto che qualche strategia non è disponibile 
ai giocatori. L ’interpretazione del gioco non influenza il suo equilibrio. Ad
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ogni modo se interpretiamo il gioco nel modo precedente possiamo sempre 
prolungare la frontiera Pareto ottimale fino ad incontrare i due assi, come 
illustrato dalle parti punteggiate delle curve in Figura 4. D ’ora in poi dobbia­
mo cambiare leggermente le nostre convenzioni notazionali. 0  (.) denoterà 
la frontiera Pareto ottimale in senso forte del gioco allargato. Se per un 
determinato t non c’è alcun bisogno d’allargare la frontiera Pareto ottimale 
in senso forte, allora quella del gioco allargato sarà identica a quella del 
gioco originale. ux (t) e ùx (t) denoteranno invece i valori minimali e massi­
mali di ux al tempo t del gioco originario. Analogamente 0  (ùx (/), t) e 0  {ux 
(t), t) saranno quelle di u2 e saranno anche denotati rispettivamente u2 (t) e 
ù2 (t). Ora possiamo scrivere l’analogo di (4)-(6) nel seguente modo:
(23) G («!, T) .= 0 ! (0 2 (... (0 ! (0 2 («!, T -  1), T -  2)...), 1), 0), 
dove:
(24) 0, (z, t) =  min [0, (z, /), ùt (/)],
(25) =  ux (T) se il gioco è troncato in T — 1,
(26) ux =  ùx (T) se il gioco è troncato in T,
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dove come al solito T =  2n, n =  1, 2, 3,... . Siccome dalla (23) e dalla (4) 
deriva la:
(27) G («! (T), T) -  G («j (T), T) <  F (ü, (T), T) -  F  (0, T), 
la dimostrazione può seguire gli stessi passi del lemma precedente.
c) Caso generale.
L ’argomentazione utilizzata nella parte a. di questa dimostrazione può 
essere facilmente generalizzata a qualsiasi situazione in cui la linea congiun­
gente u, (t) e « , • ( / — 1) è inclinata negativamente, mentre la parte b. può 
essere facilmente generalizzata al caso in cui tale linea è inclinata positiva- 
mente. Q.E.D.
Annotazione. Il sistema (2 3 )-(26) fornisce un algoritmo per calcolare le strategie 
d’equilibrio perfetto dei due agenti con il grado di approssimazione desiderato. 
Infatti, per ogni dato e , il sistema può calcolare il T minimo e un equilibrio 
e (T) perfetto associato tale che e (T) <  e , dove e (T) è la distanza massima 
fra le strategie di equilibrio perfetto del gioco troncato in T e quello troncato in T 
-  1 .
L ’algoritmo utilizzato ha due conseguenze di facile dimostrazione, che perciò 
verrà omessa. Innanzi tutto l’accordo viene raggiunto al tempo 0, risultato che 
può essere dimostrato con argomentazioni analoghe a quelle usate a proposito del 
Lemma 4.1. Inoltre l’equilibrio è indipendente da alternative irrilevanti. Questo 
significa che se Í  è un gioco di contrattazione e g* è il suo equilibrio perfetto e I* 
è un gioco identico al precedente ad eccezione del fatto che S' ( °°  ) S (°°), 
inoltre se g* e S' ( ° ° ) ,  allora g* è l’equilibrio perfetto anche per r. Se infatti 
denotiamo con S (T, °o ) lo spazio di strategie possibili da T fino ad infinito ed 
inoltre denotiamo con r'T la classe di giochi definita poco sopra per i quali S' (T, 
CO ) ~  S(T ,  °o ) è facile dimostrare che se la proprietà vale per Q vale anche per 
r'T ,. Inoltre sicuramente vale per r[ quindi per induzione è possibile dimostrare 
la proprietà.
5. Alcuni esempi
Finora abbiamo dimostrato che l’equilibrio perfetto del gioco di contrat­
tazione qui presentato possiede molte proprietà che possono essere pensate 
come generalizzazioni del concetto di soluzione di Nash. Più precisamente 
esso esiste, è unico, Pareto ottimale (in senso forte), indipendente da trasfor­
mazioni lineari e da alternative irrilevanti: ancora non sappiamo, però, se 
esso è anche simmetrico. In questa sezione tratteremo soltanto di funzioni
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d’utilità caratterizzate da sconto. Quindi possiamo definire la simmetria 
come segue: se 0 j =  <P2 e 1 giocatori hanno lo stesso tasso di sconto, allora 
il risultato d’equilibrio perfetto assegna ad entrambi i giocatori la stessa 
utilità.
Dimostreremo con alcuni esempi che in generale l’equilibrio perfetto 
del gioco di contrattazione non gode della proprietà di simmetria. Inoltre gli 
esempi suggeriscono che il giocatore che inizia il processo di contrattazione 
in generale gode d’un vantaggio contrattuale.
a. Il modello generalizzato di Rubinstein con sconto.
Consideriamo
d’utilità:
ora il gioco di contrattazione con le seguenti funzioni
(28) «! =  x S per ogni t,
(29) u2 — y S ‘2, per ogni t,
(30) y =  0  (x), per ogni t,
Per questo genere di gioco è possibile provare il seguente lemma:
L emma 5.1. Se le funzioni di utilità soddisfano le (28)-(30) e se x * , 0  (x*) è 
il risultato di equilibrio perfetto per il gioco, assumendo che i giocatori 
comincino la contrattazione al tempo t, esso sarà anche il risultato di equili­
brio perfetto se i giocatori cominciano la contrattazione al tempo t +  2.
D imostrazione. Il lemma è una stretta conseguenza della proprietà d ’indi­
pendenza da trasformazioni lineari, infatti è sufficiente moltiplicare le funzio­
ni di utilità del gioco che parte da t +  2 rispettivamente per <5̂"2 e <5̂ 2 e 
otterremo il gioco che parte da t. Q.E.D.
Inoltre, possiamo osservare che se al tempo 0 il giocatore 1 effettua 
una domanda in termini di utilità attesa e al tempo 1 l’equilibrio perfetto gli 
garantisce y1, allora l’equilibrio perfetto per il giocatore 2 al tempo 0 sarà:
(31) 0  (x °) =  0  {y1) S2.
Analogamente, se al tempo 2 l’equilibrio perfetto garantisce al giocato­
re 2 x2, l’equilibrio perfetto al tempo 1 gli garantisce:
(32) y  =  x2 Sv
Per il Lemma 5.1 abbiamo che x° =  x2 =  x, da cui:
(33) 0  (x) =  0  (x £,) S2
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definisce il risultato d’equilibrio perfetto quando il giocatore 1 inizia la 
contrattazione.
E anche possibile ricavare una dimostrazione analoga per il gioco in cui 
è il giocatore 2 a iniziare la contrattazione e troviamo che i due equilibri 
perfetti sono rispettivamente la soluzione per x e la soluzione per y del 
sistema:
(34) y =  X  Slt
(35) 0  (x) =  0  (y) S2.
Se semplifichiamo ulteriormente il sistema (28)-(30) nel seguente:
(36) ux — x S j ,  per ogni t,
(37) u2 — y $ 2> Per °8 ni h
(38) x =  1 — y, 0 <  j  <  1, per ogni t.
otteniamo evidentemente il gioco di Rubinstein con sconto. Il risultato 
d’equilibrio perfetto, a seconda che il processo di contrattazione sia iniziato 
dal giocatore 1 o dal giocatore 2, sarà rispettivamente determinato dalla 
soluzione per x e dalla soluzione per y del seguente sistema:
(39) y =  x Su
(40) x =  1 -  S2 +  y S2.
Le due soluzioni sono:
(41) x =  (1 - S 2)/(l - S l S2),
(42) y =  S2 (1 -  i j ) / ( l  -  Sl S2) \
che chiaramente non rispettano le condizioni di simmetria. Finora abbiamo 
dimostrato che in generale il gioco non è simmetrico. Sarebbe interessante 
trovare una classe generale di giochi i quali abbiano per lo meno approssima­
tivamente questa proprietà. L ’intuito suggerisce un primo candidato in quei 
giochi nei quali l’intervallo di contrattazione, cioè, il periodo di tempo tra 
uno stadio del processo di contrattazione e l’altro, tende a 0.
b. Il modello generalizzato di Rubinstein con sconto e intervalli di contratta­
zione indefinitamente piccoli. 4
4 In verità il risultato vale solo se 0 <  S¡ <  1, i =  1, 2,... Per i dettagli si confronti 
Rubinstein (1982).
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Denominiamo con A l’intervallo di tempo tra uno stadio della contratta­
zione e il seguente. Possiamo trasformare la nostra variabile originale indi­
cante il tempo come segue:
(43) t =  dr.
Il modello è quello presentato in (28)-(30) ma, per convenienza matematica, 
imponiamo: S1 =  e~aA e S2 =  é~^A. Inoltre assumiamo che 0  (.) sia 
differenziale in un intorno dell’equilibrio. Ora possiamo scrivere la (33) 
nel seguente modo:
(44) 0  (x) =  0  (xe~aA) é~pA.
Possiamo differenziare la (44) rispetto a A e ottenere
(45) 0 '  (x) x =  — ¡Ì0  (xé~aA) é~̂ A +  0 '  (xe~aA) (x e~aA — axé~aA) é~^A.
Il limite della (45) per A —» 0, dopo alcune semplificazioni, è:
(46) Py/ax =  — 0 ' (x),
(47) y =  0 (x ).
In questo caso il sistema (46)-(47) caratterizza completamente il limite 
del nostro equilibrio perfetto, e ovviamente soddisfa la nostra condizione di 
simmetria.
Annotazione. Nella sezione precedente abbiamo visto che questo gioco per 
T finito attribuisce un “potere” al giocatore che gioca per ultimo. Questa proprietà 
è molto ben conosciuta nei giochi di Stackelberg a somma zero ed è stata 
conservata nell’attuale gioco che può essere pensato come un gioco alla Stackel­
berg ripetuto. Abbiamo visto che la “asimmetria” da ultima mossa scompare se T 
—> oo. In giochi con sconto abbiamo visto che vi è anche un’altra forma di 
asimmetria: quella da prima mossa. Il primo giocatore ha un vantaggio perché 
deve scontare per meno tempo. L ’asimmetria scompare al tendere di A a 0, ma è 
importante sottolineare che se i due giocatori fanno le loro richieste e decidono se 
accettare le richieste dell’altro simultaneamente, il gioco ha infiniti equilibri. 
Perciò un certo grado di asimmetria è necessario per ottenere i risultati della 
sezione precedente, anche se possiamo rendere questa asimmetria piccola a piace­
re.
Infine, si può facilmente dimostrare che il sistema (46)-(47) è la solu­
zione del seguente problema:
max x1/“ yW
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(48) S.t. y =  0  (x).
Dovrebbe essere chiaro che la soluzione del problema (48), non è 
simmetrica in senso statico, dato che le utilità dei due giocatori sono ponde­
rate dall’inverso dei rispettivi tassi istantanei di sconto. Il sistema (48) è 
noto, nell’approccio assiomatico, come la soluzione asimmetrica 5 ed i due 
pesi sono di solito interpretati come indici del potere, o della capacità di 
contrattazione, dei due agenti. Qui la capacità di contrattazione dei due 
agenti è data dalla loro stessa capacità di aspettare, sintetizzata dall’inverso 
del tasso istantaneo di sconto. La razionalità di questo risultato è la seguen­
te: quanto più alto è il valore del futuro per un agente, tanto meno efficace 
sarà la minaccia dell’altro di non voler giungere ad un accordo nel presente 
periodo.
6. Conclusioni
In questo articolo abbiamo analizzato una sorta di versione generalizza­
ta del modello di contrattazione di Rubinstein e siamo riusciti a dimostrare 
l’esistenza e l’unicità dell’equilibrio. La dimostrazione si è servita del teore­
ma di Fudenberg e Levine sugli equilibri perfetti in giochi ad orizzonte 
infinito visti come il limite di una serie di equilibri e-perfetti. La dimostra­
zione fornisce anche una tecnica per il calcolo delle strategie di equilibrio ad 
ogni desiderato livello di approssimazione.
Lo scopo principale di questo articolo è stato quello di confrontare le 
proprietà dell’approccio strategico di Rubinstein con quello assiomatico. Il 
risultato è stato che l’equilibrio del nostro gioco evidenzia molte delle pro­
prietà dei concetti di soluzione proposti nell’approccio assiomatico. Oltre ad 
essere unico è anche Pareto-ottimale in senso stretto, indipendente da trasfor­
mazioni lineari e da alternative irrilevanti. Alcune di queste proprietà sono 
state ridefinite per essere compatibili con il nuovo contesto dinamico. Nella 
definizione di Pareto-ottimalità abbiamo dovuto aggiungere esplicitamente la 
proprietà secondo la quale un accordo deve essere raggiunto nel primo 
periodo.
Con pochi esempi abbiamo dimostrato che il nostro gioco non è simme­
trico: in generale il giocatore che inizia la contrattazione ha un vantaggio. 
Questo è stato fatto attraverso la computazione dell’equilibrio nel semplice 
caso di sconto, sia nel modello di Rubinstein, sia in una versione leggermen­
5 Roth (1979, pp. 15-19). L ’autore ha anche dimostrato che il sistema (48) caratterizza il 
risultato d’equilibrio perfetto anche nel caso <2> (*) non sia differenziabile.
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te generalizzata. Abbiamo anche provato che nel caso in cui l’intervallo tra il 
passo della contrattazione e il successivo tende a 0, l’equilibrio perfetto di 
questi giochi converge ad una soluzione simmetrica. Infine, nel caso di 
sconto e di intervalli di contrattazione indefinitamente piccoli, possiamo 
derivare endogenamente una sorta di funzione del benessere.
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AXIOMATIC AND STRATEGIC THEORIES OF BARGAINING: A COM­
PARISON OF RESULTS
This paper generalizes Rubinstein’s (1982) bargaining model to less restric­
tive utility functions than those he considered. The author succeeds in obtaining 
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. The proof uses Fudenberg-Levi- 
ne’s (1983) theory of infinite horizon games and it is constructive. This means 
that it can provide an algorithm for calculating the perfect equilibrium strategies 
with any degree of approximation. The perfect equilibrium has some properties 
which can be thought of as extensions of those of Nash’s solution concept. The 
properties are: Pareto optimality, independence of linear transformations and 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. In the case of discounting, the perfect 
equilibrium is certainly asymmetric. If the interval between one step of the 
bargaining and the next approaches zero, the perfect equilibrium tends to a 
symmetric outcome, at least in a dynamic sense.
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TRADE IMBALANCE, THE FACTOR PROPORTIONS 
THEORY AND THE RESOURCE CONTENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
by
F.R. C a sa s  *  and E.K. C h o i  * *
Abstract
This paper shows how a trade imbalance can distort the pattern of 
commodity trade and cause a reversal of indirect factor trade, so that neither 
the factor intensity ranking of the export and import bundles nor the sign of 
net resource flows may be relied upon to reveal a country’s factor abundance. 
Using the ratio of trade surplus or deficit to income as a yardstick, we demon­
strate that the U.S. would have exported capital and imported labor had trade 
been balanced in 1947 and hence the Leon tief Paradox is attributable to the 
U.S. 1947 trade surplus.
I. Introduction
Although the central theme of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of the deter­
minant of the pattern of international trade has been to relate the factor 
intensity ranking of traded commodities to the trading countries’ resource 
endowments, a major focus of attention in the last three decades has been 
the direction and the composition of intercountry flow of resources em­
bodied in traded goods *. An important stimulus to this theoretical devel-
*  University of Toronto, Department of Economics, Toronto, Ontario (Canada).
* *  Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa (U.S.A.).
The helpful comments received from P. Abbott, R.W. Jones and J. Pomery are gratefully 
acknowledged, though none but the authors should be held responsible for any errors.
1 See for example Vanek (1968, 1971) and H oriba (1971, 1974). A related issue which has 
also drawn considerable discussion is the factor price equalization theory.
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opment was provided by the need to extend the factor proportions theory 
beyond the conventional two-good, two-factor model in the wake of Leon- 
tief’s (1953, 1956) empirical finding that U.S. import replacements had 
been capital intensive relative to American exports in 1947 and 1951. 
Following the publication of Leontief’s results and those of a series of 
similar studies, a number of attempts were made to explain what had 
become known as the Leontief Paradox. While it is not within the scope of 
this paper to survey these empirical studies and the explanatory theories 
they fostered 2, it may be pointed out that the latter fell into two broad 
categories: either the paradox indicated that the U.S. pattern of trade was 
not primarily determined by the nation’s relative factor abundance 3, or the 
paradox might be resolved within the framework of the factor proportions 
theory itself4.
Among the latter group of explanations, the possibility that Leontief’s 
finding did not reveal a scarcity of capital in the U.S. as much as it reflected 
a scarcity of natural resources came under close scrutiny 5, particularly since 
the U.S. had been indirectly exporting both capital and labor during the 
periods covered by the studies 6. It was important therefore to extend the 
scope of the factor proportions theory to cover the multi-factor as well as 
the multi-good cases — since in the latter case the pattern of domestic 
resource allocation, and hence of commodity trade, may be indeterminate 7 
—, in order to compare the results with those derived from the simple model 
and to develop testable hypotheses in terms of the factor intensity ranking 
of traded commodities and/or the pattern of indirect factor trade.
Relatively little attention, however, has been given to the implications 
of trade imbalances on the volume and the composition of a country’s 
external commodity exchange and to the difficulties such imbalances may 
raise in an empirical test of the relevance of the factor proportions theory
2 The interested reader is referred to Baldwin (1971).
3 This includes the possibility that the U.S. pattern of trade might reflect international 
differences in technology or tastes, the existence of domestic market imperfections, or increasing 
returns to scale.
4 It may be, for example, that U.S. exports would have been revealed capital intensive if 
capital had been defined to include human as well as physical capital, or U.S. exports may be skill 
intensive or R & D intensive, etc.
3 See for example Diab (1956), Vanek (1959, 1963) and Travis (1964).
6 Baldwin (1971) has shown that this was also the case for American trade in 1962. 
However, M itchell (1975), Stern and Maskus (1981), and Maskus (1983) have documented the 
shifts which have occurred in the commodity composition and the factor content of U.S. trade 
during the 1960’s, which pushed that country’s trade pattern by the early 1970’s into conformity 
with the predictions of the Heckscher Ohlin theory.
7 See Samuelson (1953), Melvin (1968), Hong (1970), Vanek and Bertrand (1971).
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for any given country’s trade pattern 8. The purpose of this paper is to show 
that by distorting the pattern of commodity trade, a trade imbalance may 
reverse the factor intensity ranking of traded goods as well as the pattern of 
indirect factor trade.
In Section 2 we review the major characteristics of a country’s foreign 
trade in a multi-good model in which trade is balanced and the pattern of 
trade is determined by international differences in relative factor endow­
ments. In Section 3 we contrast these conventional results with those which 
would be obtained in the presence of a trade surplus or deficit, and we then 
use our findings to formulate in Section 4 a number of hypotheses which 
can be used to infer a country’s factor abundance or scarcity. Section 5 
applies the proposed tests to Leontief’s data to demonstrate that his para­
doxical finding can be attributed to the U.S. 1947 trade surplus. Section 6 
contains a brief summary and conclusions.
II. The Patterns of Commodity and Factor Exchange Under Balanced Trade
Consider a country producing m commodities using n factors, with m 
>  n. Assume that technologies are internationally identical and linearly 
homogeneous, that consumer preferences are also internationally identical 
and homothetic, and that product and factor markets are perfectly competi­
tive. The following two propositions may then be established.
The Vanek-Williams Theorem: Under balanced trade a country will 
export the services of its abundant factors and import the services of its 
scarce factors 9.
With internationally identical and homothetic tastes, the domestic and 
world consumption vectors must be collinear under free trade, so that we 
may write
Cj =  CLC’, ( 1)
where c} and cj respectively denote the domestic and world consumption of 
the yth good, and a  is the ratio of domestic to world expenditure 10. Let y, 
and yj denote the domestic and world production of the yth good. Since
8 A notable exception is Williams (1970) whose contribution is discussed below.
9 See Leamer (1980) for an alternative version of this theorem using income shares.
10 This follows from the fact that C  =  Z  p j Cj =  Z  p] a c j =  a  Z  p - cj
=  a C ', where p j is the price of the yth commodity, and C  and C ’ are domestic and world 
consumption.
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world consumption of any commodity must equal world output, equation 
(1) may be rewritten as
Cj =  ay'. (2)
Given the assumption of internationally identical and linearly homoge­
neous technologies, and with the further stipulation that factor price equali­
zation obtains under free trade n, each commodity will be produced using 
the same input-output coefficients. Let I and Y denote the domestic and 
world supplies of input I {I =  K, L, ...), and let I, represent the amount of 
resource I the services of which are embodied in the home country’s net 
exports. It is then readily shown with the use of equation (2) that
m
If =  z  % (y, ~  Cj )  =  -  I -aY  (3)
where aI; is the amount of factor I per unit of the /th good.
While the definition of relative factor abundance loses its simplicity in 
a many-factor world, it is convenient to use the definition proposed by 
Williams (1970) according to which a country is abundant (scarce) in re­
source I if the ratio of the country’s endowment to the world endowment 
exceeds (falls short of) the ratio of domestic to world income, i.e., if 
I/Y > ( < )  Y/Y', where Y and Y' are domestic and world income respec­
tively 1 2. Since under balanced trade domestic consumption and income 
are equal, a =  Y/Y' so that equation (3) implies that
J, 1  0 iff I/Y |  Y/Y', (4)
that is, a country will export the services of its abundant factors and import 
those of its scarce factors under balanced trade 13. %
11 Since m >  n, factor price equalization requires incomplete specialization in at least n 
commodities.
12 This definition coincides with the familiar physical definition of factor abundance in the 
two-factor case since, for example, K/K' >  Y/Y' =  (wL +  rK)/(wL' +  rK')} where w and r are 
the prices of L and K respectively, if and only if K/K ' >  Y/Y' >  L/L ’.
1! First formulated by Williams (1970), this result was recently rediscovered by Bjecher 
and Choudhri (1982) who use the equivalent formulation f; 0 if and only if C /l C/Y. 
Earlier, Vanek (1968) had shown that if resources are ranked in order of decreasing domestic to 
world endowment ratios, I/Y, the home country would export the services of the first t factors (1 
<  t <  n) and import the services of the remaining (n - 1) factors, the value of t being determined 
by factor prices. Williams’ (1970) formulation shows that Y/Y' is the value which breaks the 
chain of I/Y  ratios into exported and imported factors. Bertrand (1972) extended the analysis to 
cases where factor price equalization is not assumed and where the identical demand hypothesis is 
relaxed.
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It is important to note that while it is true that if a country exports 
(imports) the services of a single factor, that country may unambiguously be 
identified as abundant (scarce) in the exported (imported) factor relative to 
all other factors, no such inference is possible where several factors are 
indirectly exported or imported under balanced trade. The pattern of factor- 
al flows will reveal abundance (scarcity) of each exported (imported) re­
source relative to each imported (exported) factor, but not relative to other 
exported (imported) factors. The latter may be inferred from a comparison 
of the shares of domestic resources exported of imported since, as estab­
lished by Vanek (1968) and as may be seen from equation (3), the ranking 
of the ratios of individual factors to domestic endowments I J l  is the same 
as the ranking of the ratios of domestic to foreign endowements III'.
The Leontief-Leamer Theorem: If a country is abundant in factor U and 
scarce in factor V, then under balanced trade the country will export a 
commodity bundle characterized by a higher U/V ratio than the imported 
bundle. However, a higher U/V ratio for exports than for imports does not 
necessarily reflect abundance in U relative to V, except if U and V are the 
only two factors.
Even with two factors of production the domestic resource allocation is 
indeterminate when more than two goods are produced, raising the possibili­
ty that a country may import goods some of which are intensive in the use 
of one factor while others are intensive in the use of the second factor 
relative to exports, and vice-versa u. The pattern of a country’s commodity 
trade is thus itself indeterminate in the sense that it is not possible to 
uniquely relate the ranking of individual traded goods in terms of their 
relative factor intensities to the country’s relative factor endowment.
However, it can readily be shown that in the two-factor balanced trade 
case a country’s export bundle must be relatively intensive in the use of the 
abundant factor while the import bundle must be intensive in the use of the
m w
scarce factor. To see this, let Ix =  2 a!] x; and Im =  2  alt mt represent
the amounts of factor I embodied in gross exports (x; ) and imports [m/] 
respectively, with
I  =  4  -  L- (5) 14
14 See Melvin (1968). Chacholiades (1978, pp. 288-90) provides a numerical example in 
which a country producing three goods imports the most and the least labor intensive commodi­
ties. It must be noted that for any set of commodity prices, a country’s factor endowment may lead 
it to completely specialize in the production of a number of goods and to rely on imports for 
products some of which are more capital and others are more labor intensive than those supplied 
domestically. In such cases factor prices may not be equalized internationally. See J ones (1974).
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If the two factors are denoted U and V, then either U/U' >  Y/Y' >  V/V' 
or U/U' <  Y/Y' <  V/V’, so that (4) and (5) together imply
U JV X % U jV m iff U/U' ^  V/V'. (6)
This formulation corresponds to the multi-commodity version of the factor 
proportions theory which Leontief (1953, 1956) tested in his studies of 
U.S. trade for 1947 and 1951 15.
In the many-factor case, if a country exports the services of factor U 
and imports the services of factor V, the U/V ratio of that country’s exports 
must exceed that of its imports. This will necessarily be the case for any pair 
of factors comprising an abundant resource and a scarce resource. However, 
the converse of this proposition is not true-, the U/V ratio of a country’s 
exports may exceed that of its imports even though the country has a 
relatively lower domestic to world endowment of resource U, provided both 
resources U and V are abundant or scarce in terms of Williams’ definition or 
equivalently, if the services of both factors are exported or imported. As 
noted by Learner (1980), when the services of two factors flow in the same 
direction, the ranking of the export and import bundles in terms of the 
ratios in which these two factors are used need not match the ranking of the 
country’s endowment ratio relative to the world for the same two resources.
It follows that if two factors are observed flowing in opposite direc­
tions under balanced trade, the factor intensity ranking of the traded bun­
dles in terms of those two factors would reveal the country’s abundance in 
the exported factor relative to the imported factor. However, no inference 
may be drawn about relative factor abundance from the factor intensity 
ranking of traded bundles in terms of two factors which flow in the same 
direction. Leontief’s data provide an example of the latter case since both 
labor and capital services were exported by the U.S. in 1947, so that it was 
inappropriate to infer the American relative capital or labor abundance from 
the ranking of the capital-labor ratios of U.S. exports and imports.
III. Trade Imbalance and Factor Trade Flow Reversal
Let us now consider the case where a country’s trade with the outside 
world is not balanced. Given internationally identical and homothetic prefer-
15 Leontief computed the ratios Ix/X  and where X  =  1  pj Xj and M =  I  pj my,
for capital and labor, and compared [(Kx/X )I(L JX )\  with [(Km/M)/(Lm/M)]. Condition (6) was 
also derived by Leamer (1980).
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enees, a trade imbalance does not shift the world demand for any commodi­
ty since a country’s surplus (deficit) must be exactly offset by the deficit 
(surplus) in the rest of the world. Thus a trade imbalance does not affect 
commodity and factor prices or the domestic allocation of resources, but 
given the assumption of homothetic preferences it would decrease (in the 
case of a trade surplus) or increase (in the case of a deficit) the consumption 
of all goods equiproportionately.
For factor and commodity exchange with a trade imbalance we can 
establish two propositions which are the counterparts of the Vanek-Wil­
liams and the Leontief-Leamer theorems:
Theorem 1 : A trade imbalance may cause a reversal in a country’s 
indirect factor trade flow. In particular, a surplus country may export its 
scarce factors and a deficit country may import its abundant factors.
Since the ratio of domestic to world expenditure, a =  C /C , is no 
longer equal to the ratio of domestic to world income, Y/Y', when trade is 
not balanced, equation (3) now implies
7, 1  0 iff (7/7') |  (C/Y) (Y/Y' ). (7)
It follows that
(i) if the home country has a trade surplus (C <  Y), then 7 may be 
exported (I, >  0) even though it is a scarce resource (7/7' <  Y/Y').
(ii) if the home country has a trade deficit (C >  Y), then 7 may be 
imported (I, <  0) even though it is an abundant resource (7/7' >  Y/Y').
However, it should be noted that a modified version of Vanek’s (1968) 
result that a country exports its relatively abundant factors and import its 
relatively scarce factors remains valid. This is because equation (3) holds 
independently of the trade balance, so that the ranking of the shares of net 
exports of domestic factors, IJI , will again mirror that of the ratios of 
domestic to world endowements, 7/7'. This implies that if under balanced 
trade a country would have exported the services of its t most abundant 
factors (1 <  t <  n) and imported those of the remaining (n — t) resources, 
that country would export the services of its s >  t most abundant factors 
under a trade surplus, and may even export the services of all factors (r <  
n) in such a case. With a deficit, s <  t and the country might import the 
services of all factors (j >  0) .
It remains, however, that the resource content of a country’s foreign 
trade becomes a less accurate reflection of its relative factor abundance 
when trade is not balanced. It will be still true that if two factors are 
observed to flow in opposite directions the home country is abundant in the 
exported factor relative to the imported factor. However, it is possible that
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while relative abundance between two factors would be revealed under 
balanced trade if they flow in opposite directions, these factors may both be 
exported or imported when trade is not balanced. In the case of Leontief’s 
data, for example, the U.S. had a considerable trade surplus, raising the 
possibility that the observation that both capital and labor were indirectly 
exported might be “explained” in terms of this imbalance and that either 
resource might have been imported if trade had been balanced.
Theorem 2: A trade imbalance may cause a reversal in the factor 
intensity ranking of a country’s traded commodity bundles. In particular, 
even in a two-factor world a country’s exports may be intensive in its scarce 
factor and imports may be intensive in its abundant factor.
A trade imbalance will affect the volume of a country’s external trade 
flows and may also alter its pattern of commodity trade. Specifically, a 
surplus country may export goods which it would import under balanced 
trade, while a deficit country may import commodities which would have 
been imported under balanced trade. This follows from the fact that with an 
asterisk denoting the value of a variable under balanced trade as distin-
guished from its actual value, we may write
y. =  yf  and 9 = (C/Y) cf, (8)
so that
y, -  ci % y f - c* iff C 1  Y. (9)
It remains true that if the trade imbalance does not affect the pattern 
of indirect factor flows for two resources one of which is exported and the 
other is imported, inequality (6) would hold, even though the commodity 
composition of the export and import bundles might be different. It is in the 
case where a surplus (deficit) country exports (imports) two factors one of 
which would have been imported (exported) under balanced trade that the 
possibility exists of a reversal in the factor intensity ranking of exports and 
imports as a result of the trade imbalance.
Consider the following example. In Table 1 the input-output coeffi­
cients for each of three commodities are shown, together with domestic 
output y f , consumption cf and net exports (yf — cf) for each commodity 
under balanced trade 16. For simplicity, units have been defined to normalize 
all prices to unity. The country would then export commodity 3 and import 
commodities 1 and 2. The average capital-labor ratios of the export and 
import bundles would be
16 Bracketed figures indicate negative values.
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k ? _  % 3 (y * ~  c3*) _  2
4 *  *L3 ( t f  -  3̂* )
K l  =  aK1 (yf -  q*) +  %2 te* -  t f )  =  !  4 
L*m aLl (yf -  cf) +  aL2 (y2*  -  c2*)  ’
where K *  and L *  respectively denote the amount of capital and labor 
embodied in exports under balanced trade, and K*m and L*m are similarly 
defined for imports. A comparison of these two ratios would reveal this 
country’s capital abundance. The same conclusion would be reached by 
observing that the country is a net exporter of capital services (Kt =  50) 
and a net importer of labor services (Lt =  — 50).
Table 1.
Industry aLj % y f c f y f  -  cf y j CJ y j  -  cj
1 1 1 850 900 (50) 850 450 400
2 4/5 6/5 50 300 (250) 50 150 (100)
3 2/3 4/3 600 300 300 600 150 450
Assume now that this country incurs a trade surplus. As previously 
argued, the production vector would be unchanged at constant commodity 
prices. Commodity prices remain unchanged since imbalance does not affect 
world demand due to internationally identical and homothetie preferences. 
However, a trade surplus reduces the consumption of all goods equipropor- 
tionately. For the purpose of illustration, let consumption of all goods 
decline by fifty percent. The resulting levels of domestic production yJt 
consumption Cj, and net exports {y} — c- ) are shown in the last three columns 
of Table 1.
The country would now be observed to export commodities 1 and 3, 
in exchange for imports of commodity 2. The average capital-labor ratios of 
the export and import bundles would become
K  _  aK\ foi ~ q) +  aKi (Vi ~  ci> — 1.428,
Lx q.t (ti -  q) +  au  Oh -  c )
K m _  aK2 O2 ~ C2) _  1
L m <*L2 O2 _ C2)
so that (K JL X) <  (Km/ L J .  That the factor intensity ranking of the traded 
bundles may not be an accurate indicator of the country’s relative factor
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abundance in this case is revealed by the fact that both capital (Kt — 880) 
and labor (Lt =  620) are indirectly exported.
IV. Formulating Testable Hypotheses When Trade Is Not Balanced
Since neither the indirect flows of resources for a country nor the 
factor intensity ranking of its export and import replacement bundles may 
be relied upon to reveal that country’s relative factor abundance when trade 
is not balanced, is it possible to infer abundance from trade data? Because 
this problem arises only when more than one resource is exported or im­
ported, we confine our discussion to such cases and consider three ap­
proaches.
(A) The first method involves ranking the factor intensities of domestic 
production, consumption and foreign trade and is closely related to Learner’s 
(1980) investigation of the Leontief Paradox 17. Note that
m
I, -  Z aj- (y! -  Cj) -  I -  Ic, (10)
where Ic denotes the amount of factor I embodied in the domestic consump­
tion bundle. With the help of equation (3) we may establish that for any 
two factors U and V,
U JU  ^  V JV  iff U/U' ^  V/V. (11)
Hence,
Uc/Vc ^  U/V iff U/U' ^  V/V. (12)
It follows that a country which exports or imports the services of two 
factors, U and V, will be revealed abundant in U relative to V if domestic 
production is U-intensive relative to domestic consumption, and vice-versa. 
To establish global abundance in U (relative to all other factors) would 
require that domestic production be U-intensive compared to domestic con­
sumption in terms of all other exported factors, or all other factors if none is 
exported. Conversely, global scarcity in U would be revealed if domestic 
consumption is U-intensive compared to domestic production in terms of all 
other imported factors. Equivalently, global abundance (scarcity) in U 
would be revealed if the ratio of domestic consumption to endowment,
17 Learner discusses the possibility that a country may indirectly export or import two re­
sources, capital and labor, in exchange for a third resource rather than as a result of a trade 
imbalance.
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Uc/U, is smaller (larger) than the corresponding ratios for all other exported 
(imported) factors.
Alternatively, we may wish to compare the factor intensity of a 
country’s net trade bundle with that of the domestically produced or con­
sumed bundles. It is then possible to use either of the following tests.
(i) A country which exports (imports) resources U and V will be 
revealed abundant in U relative to V if trade is U-(V-) intensive relative to 
domestic production. This follows from the fact that equation (11) implies 
that with U/U' >  V /V , Ut/Vt ^  U/V if U„ Vt ^  0, and vice-versa.
(ii) A country which exports (imports) resources U and V will be 
revealed abundant in U relative to V if trade is U-(V-) intensive relative to 
domestic consumption. This follows from the fact that U/V >  UJVC im­
plies Uc/V: 5s UJV, if Ut, Vt \  0, and vice-versa.
More generally, we would expect UjVt >  U/V >  UJV C in the case 
of a relatively U-abundant country when both U and V are exported, but 
U/V >  Uc/Vc >  UJVt for a U-abundant country when both U and V are 
imported, and vice-versa.
(B) A second approach uses trade data to compute the hypothetical 
balanced trade values of net commodity exports for each commodity. From 
equation (8),
y * ~  c* =  y, ~  (Y/C) Cj, (13)
so that it becomes possible to identify the balanced trade export and import 
bundles and with the help of input-output coefficients to compare the input 
ratios of these hypothetical bundles for any two factors. However, unless 
the two resources would flow in opposite directions under balanced trade, 
the factor intensity ranking of the hypothetical export and import bundles 
may not reflect the country’s relative factor abundance. The required compu­
tations are also likely to be cumbersome but this approach has the advantage 
of explicitly revealing how the trade imbalance has affected the pattern of 
commodity trade and the factor intensity ranking of exports and imports.
(C) The third approach involves the computation of the hypothetical 
values of indirect net resource flows under balanced trade. In particular,
m
since I *  =  I  aTi (y* -  c*), and c* =  (Y/C) c., the share of factor I* ; _ i V J J J  J
that would be exported under balanced trade is given by
I f / l  =  1 -  (Y/C) (IJU  =  (Y/C) [(I,/1) -  (T/Y )]
=  (IJI)  [1 -  (IJU) (T /C )l (14)
where T =  Y — C. It follows that net exports of factor I would be positive
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under balanced trade, and the country would be revealed abundant in that 
factor, if and only if
(i) the ratio of domestic consumption to endowment of factor I is 
smaller than the ratio of domestic expenditure to output, i.e., I j l  <  C/Y ; 
or
(ii) the share of the domestic endowment of factor I  which is exported 
(imported) exceeds (falls short of) the ratio of trade surplus (deficit) to 
domestic output, i.e., I j l  >  T/Y; or
(iii) the ratio of net exports (imports) to domestic consumption of 
factor I is larger (smaller) than the ratio of the trade surplus (deficit) to 
domestic consumption, i.e., I J IC >  T/C.
Conversely, net exports of factor I would be negative under balanced 
trade and the country would be revealed scarce in that factor if Ic/I  >  C/Y, 
or I J I  <  T/Y, or I J IC <  T/C. While these criteria are equivalent to 
Learner’s (1980) hypothesis when limited to pairwise comparison of abun­
dance in terms of any two factors 1S, they have the additional advantage of 
revealing the hypothetical balanced trade pattern of factoral flows. Such 
information is useful in that it would indicate whether a trade imbalance has 
reversed the sign of the net exports of any given resource, and may in such a 
case provide an explanation of a Leontief-type paradox.
V. A Re-examination of Leontief s Data
In his 1953 article, Leontief computed the amounts of capital and 
labor the services of which were embodied in U.S. exports and import 
replacements, and found that $2,550,780 and 182.313 man-years were used 
per million dollars of exports while $3,091,339 and 170.004 man-years 
were used for million dollars of import substitutes. This implied that the 
average capital-labor ratio of U.S. import replacements ($18,184 per man- 
year) was approximately 30 percent higher than the average capital-labor 
ratio for its exports ($13,991). Using the export ($16,678.4 million) and 
import ($6,175.7 million) figures for 1947 also showed that the U.S. had 
been a net exporter of both capital ($23,452 million) and labor (1,990,795 
man-years), so that no inference could be drawn regarding the capital or 
labor abundance of the U.S. vis-a-vis its trading partners from the ranking of 
the capital and labor ratios of the export and import replacement bundles 18 l9.
18 Abundance in factor U relative to V would be tested by comparing U JU  and V JV , or 
U JU C and VJVC, or U JU  and V JV .
19 In a subsequent article (1956), Leontief used adjusted figures for the capital — and labor —
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Using the data for the U.S. capital stock ($328,519.9 million) and 
labor supply (47,273,526 man-years) provided by Travis (1964), Learner 
(1980) concluded that Leontief’s figures had in fact revealed the U.S. abun­
dance in capital, relative to labor, since U.S. trade was more capital intensive 
than domestic production, which in turn was more capital intensive than 
domestic consumption. The capital-labor ratios were $11,783 per man-year 
for net exports, $6,949 for production and $6,737 for consumption. The 
same conclusion would be reached by observing that the share of the U.S. 
capital stock exported (0.0714) exceeded the share of labor exported 
(0.0424).
While Learner (1980) thus conclusively demonstrated that the U.S. 
was abundant in capital relative to labor, Brecher and Choudhri (1982) have 
recently conjectured that since labor requirements had been higher for ex­
ports than for imports, the U.S. would have presumably been a net exporter 
of labor services even under balanced trade. In that case a modified version 
of the Leontief Paradox would persist since the U.S. would then be revealed 
relatively labor abundant using the Williams’ (1970) definition. Further 
more, the possibility would remain that the capital-labor ratio of the hypo­
thetical balanced trade import replacement bundle would have exceeded 
that of the export bundle.
In view of Learner’s (1980) evidence of the U.S. capital abundance 
relative to labor, and the possibility of continued Leontief Paradox as sug­
gested by Brecher and Choudhri, two important questions remain to be 
investigated. Firstly, did Leontief’s data reveal that the U.S. was globally 
capital abundant in the sense that the U.S. was also capital abundant rela­
tive to natural resources? Empirical evidence that this was indeed the case 
was supplied by Williams (1970) who used data provided by Vanek (1963) 
to show that the U.S. had also been a net exporter of natural resources in 
1947 * 20, but that the share of natural resources exported by the U.S. 
(0.0355) was smaller than the shares of capital and labor exported. To­
output coefficients. On the basis of these figures, each million dollar of U.S. exports required the 
use of $2,084,600 of capital and 179.24 man-years, while each million dollars of import replace­
ments required $2,243,900 of capital and 164.28 man-years. Import replacements were still capital 
intensive relative to exports (though by 17.5 percent only) and both factors were indirectly 
exported.
20 Vanek found that the U.S. used $340,000 of natural resources per million dollar of exports 
and $630,000 per million dollars of import replacements. This implies that the natural resources to 
capital ratio and the natural resources to labor ratio of U.S. import replacements exceed the 
corresponding ratios of U.S. exports and suggests -  but does not prove -  scarcity of natural 
resources. Vanek’s figures also indicate that net exports of natural resources amounted to $2,095 
million.
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gether with Learner’s result, this demonstrates that the U.S. was globally 
abundant in capital and globally scarce in natural resources.
Since the U.S. actually exported all three factors in 1947, and since the 
trade data revealed its global abundance in capital and scarcity in natural 
resources, we may conclude that had trade been balanced, the U.S. would 
have been observed exporting capital and importing natural resources. The 
balanced trade net flow of labor services, however, is a priori indeterminate. 
It is necessary to ascertain the sign of this flow to resolve the version of the 
Leontief Paradox suggested by Brecher and Choudhri.
Using the value for 1947 U.S. national income at current prices pro­
vided by Woytinsky and Woytinsky (1953) of $198,688 million 21, the ratio 
of the trade surplus to domestic output is found to be approximately
0.0529. Since the share of capital exported by the U.S. exceeded, while the 
share of labor and natural resources exported fell short of this ratio, we may 
conclude that under balanced trade conditions the U.S. would have been a 
net exporter of capital, and a net importer of labor (and natural re­
sources) 22. This contradicts Brecher and Choudhri’s conjecture that the U.S. 
would have exported labor services had trade been balanced. It also follows 
that the average capital-labor ratio of the U.S. exports would have been 
found to exceed that of its import under balanced trade 23 *25, so that a strong 
presumption exists that the paradox encountered by Leontief is attributable 
to the surplus in the American 1947 balance of trade.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the implications of trade imbalances 
on the composition of commodity and indirect factor trade. Since a trade 
surplus of a country is offset by the deficit in the rest of the world, a trade 
imbalance has no effect on world demand for commodities or their prices
21 An alternative method for obtaining an estimate of the 1947 U.S. output is to use the 
domestic expenditure flows in Table 4 of Evans and Hoffenberg (1952) together with the net 
commodity trade flows computed from Table 2 of Leontief (1953). The figure thus obtained 
($194,866 million) yields the same results as those based on the Woytinsky and Woytinsky 
(1953) figure.
22 Specifically, the U.S. would have exported $6,426 million of capital (versus actual exports
of $23,452 million) and imported 536,453 man-years and $1,082 million of natural resources
(versus actual exports of 1,990,795 man-years and $2,095 million, respectively).
25 A simulation carried out by the authors using the Evans-Hoffenberg (1952) and Leon­
tief (1953) data shows that U.S. net exports would have been approximately 10 percent more 
capital intensive than import replacements on the average.
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given internationally identical and homothetic preferences. It would have no 
effect on the domestic allocation of resources but would change the amounts 
of factors embodied in the domestically consumed commodity bundle. Specif­
ically, the amounts of factors embodied in consumption would decrease or 
increase equiproportionately as the country incurs a trade surplus or deficit. 
Such a trade imbalance-induced change in factor consumption would neces­
sarily alter the volume of indirect factor trade and may even cause a reversal 
in the pattern of factor trade. Thus a surplus country may export the 
services of its scarce factors which would have been imported under bal­
anced trade, and conversely a deficit country may import the services of its 
abundant factors which would have been exported when trade is balanced.
The hypothetical values of indirect resource flows under balanced 
trade can be inferred from the actual trade data in order to determine a 
country’s relative factor abundance relative to its trading partners. For exam­
ple, we have shown that the ratio of net exports (imports) to domestic 
endowment for each of a country’s abundant factor which would be ex­
ported under balanced trade must be larger (smaller) than the ratio of that 
country’s trade surplus (deficit) to domestic output.
An important implication of our analysis is that Leontief’s method of 
ranking the capital-labor ratios for U.S. 1947 exports and imports cannot be 
relied upon to reveal its factor abundance relative to the rest of the world, 
particularly when the U.S. had such a large trade surplus that it exported 
the services of all three factors, including natural resources. Since the share 
of the U.S. capital stock exported (7.1% ) exceeded the ratio of its trade 
surplus to domestic output (5.3% ), while the shares of U.S. labor (4.2% ) 
and natural resources (3.6% ) exported fell short of that ratio, we conclude 
that had trade been balanced in 1947 the U.S. would have been observed 
indirectly exporting capital and importing labor and natural resources. Such 
a trade pattern of factors would have confirmed unambiguously the Ameri­
can capital abundance and scarcity in labor and natural resources. A strong 
presumption thus exists that Leontief would not have observed his paradox 
had U.S. trade been balanced in 1947.
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DISEQUILIBRIO COMMERCIALE, TEORIA DELLE PROPORZIONI TRA 
I FATTORI E CONTENUTO DI RISORSE DEL COMMERCIO INTERNA­
ZIONALE
Questo lavoro riprende tematiche connesse al cosiddetto ‘paradosso di Leon- 
tief’ e mostra come il disequilibrio commerciale possa distoreere la struttura 
dell’interscambio di merci e possa causare un’inversione del commercio indiretto 
di fattori, sicché né l’ordine di intensità dei fattori dei panieri importati ed 
esportati né il segno dei flussi netti di risorse possono essere indicatori decisivi 
nell’indicare lo stato di abbondanza relativa dei fattori in un certo paese. Utilizzan­
do il rapporto tra eccedenza o disavanzo commerciale rispetto al reddito quale 
indicatore, il lavoro dimostra che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero esportato capitale e 
importato lavoro se l’interscambio commerciale fosse risultato in pareggio nel 
1947, sicché il paradosso di Leontief va attribuito all’eccedenza commerciale del 
paese nel 1947.
Il tema è dunque quello delle conseguenze dei disequilibri commerciali sulla 
composizione dell’interscambio di merci e sull’interscambio indiretto di fattori. 
Poiché all’eccedenza commerciale di un paese fa riscontro il disavanzo del resto 
del mondo, il disequilibrio commerciale non reca alcun effetto sulla domanda 
mondiale di merci o sui loro prezzi, date preferenze internazionali identiche ed 
omotetiche. Esso non ha effetto sulla allocazione delle risorse all’interno, ma muta 
l’ammontare di fattori incorporato nel paniere dei consumi interni. In particolare, 
gli ammontari di fattori incorporati nel consumo diminuiscono e aumentano 
equiproporzionalmente a seconda che il paese vada incontro a un’eccedenza oppu­
re a un disavanzo commerciale. Un simile mutamento del consumo dei fattori 
indotto dallo squilibrio commerciale altera necessariamente il volume dell’inter­
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scambio indiretto di fattori e può anche determinare un rovesciamento nella 
struttura dell’interscambio di fattori. In tal modo un paese eccedentario può 
esportare i servizi dei suoi fattori scarsi che sarebbero stati importati in condizioni 
di interscambio in pareggio e viceversa un paese in disavanzo può importare i 
servizi dei suoi fattori sovrabbondanti che sarebbero stati esportati in condizioni 
di interscambio bilanciato.
I valori controfattuali dei flussi indiretti di risorse che corrispondono alla 
situazione di pareggio nell’interscambio possono essere inferiti dai dati dell’inter­
scambio effettivo, al fine di determinare la situazione effettiva di abbondanza 
relativa dei fattori in un paese al confronto delle sue controparti commerciali. 
Implicanza significativa dell’analisi in discorso è la critica del metodo di Leontief 
nell’ordinare i rapporti capitale-lavoro per gli Stati Uniti nel ’47 relativamente ai 
flussi d’interscambio: il metodo di Leontief non può fornire risultati affidabili in 
senso relativo, in particolare allorché gli Stati Uniti presentavano un ampio 
avanzo commerciale. Poiché la quota del capitale esportato (7,1%) superava il 
rapporto tra avanzo commerciale e reddito interno (5,3%), mentre l’opposto 
accadeva della quota del lavoro e delle risorse naturali, gli autori traggono la 
conclusione che, qualora l’interscambio fosse stato in pareggio, ne sarebbe risulta­
ta una esportazione indiretta di capitale e una importazione di lavoro e risorse 
naturali nel caso degli Stati Uniti.
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LA NOTION DE RARETE FACTORIELLE 
DANS LA THÉORIE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL
par
Y ves Fluckiger *
La notion de rareté factorielle a reçu, dans la théorie pure du commer­
ce international, deux définitions (celles de Léontief et de Ohlin) qui ont été 
adoptées universellement sans pour autant que les relations entre ces deux 
approches ne soient toujours clairement précisées. Le but de cet article sera 
donc d’éclaircir les liens implicites unissant ces deux définitions de la rareté 
factorielle, ce qui nous permettra de déterminer, d’une part, si elles sont 
parfaitement équivalentes, et, d’autre part, quelles conditions économiques 
garantissent leur similitude ou leur dissemblance.
1. La notion de rareté factorielle
Le concept de rareté factorielle a été défini de manière différente par 
Léontief (1956) et Ohlin (1933). Le premier définit la rareté factorielle en 
se basant sur le rapport des quantités physiques de facteurs de production 
détenus par les pays considérés. De ce point de vue, le pays A est réputé 
riche en travail, par rapport au pays B, si:
( 1 )
Au contraire de Léontief, Ohlin fonde sa définition de la rareté sur le
*  Université de Genève, Département d’Economie Politique, Genève (Switzerland).
Je remercie les professeurs Bürgenmeier et l’Huillier, ainsi que tous mes collègues du 
département d’économie politique de l’Université de Genève, pour les précieux commentaires 
qu’ils ont bien voulu me faire sur une première version de cet article.
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rapport des prix des facteurs de production régnant dans chacune des deux 
économies considérées, le pays A étant réputé pauvre en capital si:
B > 'u A
k r J
A ( 2 )
où w symbolise la rémunération du facteur de production travail et r symbo­
lise la rémunération du facteur de production capital.
En effet, dans l’approche de Ohlin, le pays qui possède du travail en 
abondance (A en l’occurrence) sera caractérisé par un prix relatif plus faible 
de ce facteur de production relativement à l’économie B.
Néanmoins si l’on considère ces deux approches sur le plan purement 
théorique, la définition de Léontief apparaît beaucoup plus rigoureuse car 
elle remonte aux sources mêmes de la rareté, à savoir les quantités physiques 
des facteurs de production détenus par les pays considérés. La définition de 
Ohlin, en revanche, s’attache à une conséquence économique de la rareté 
physique des facteurs, laquelle se traduit, dans des conditions économiques 
spécifiques, par une cherté relative du facteur rare. Cependant, pour obtenir 
cette relation univoque entre rareté physique et prix des facteurs, il est 
nécessaire d’introduire implicitement la demande. En d’autres termes, la 
définition de Ohlin repose à la fois sur les conditions de l’offre et de la 
demande, alors que l’approche par les quantités est basée uniquement sur les 
conditions régnant du côté de la production. Ainsi, il n’est pas impossible 
d’imaginer que, si les consommateurs d’un pays présentent un attrait marqué 
pour le bien qui utilise relativement intensément le facteur abondant (au 
sens physique) dans leur économie, ce facteur abondant soit malgré tout 
relativament cher en comparaison de son prix dans le pays partenaire.
De surcroît, le rapport des rémunérations factorielles est une variable 
endogène du modèle qui est susceptible, en conséquence, de se modifier 
sous l’influence de toutes les variables exogènes, ce qui rend la définition de 
Ohlin tributaire de ces dernières, contrairement à l’approche de Léontief.
En revanche, sur le plan empirique, la définition de Ohlin se prête plus 
facilement à une mesure statistique puisqu’elle est basée sur des concepts 
plus aisément quantifiables contrairement à l’approche de Léontief qui pré­
suppose une mesure des quantités physiques des facteurs de production, ce 
qui, du côté du capital essentiellement, s’avère être une véritable gageure.
Nous sommes donc en présence de deux approches conceptuelles, l’une 
étant plus rigoureuse sur le plan théorique (celle de Léontief) l’autre se 
prêtant mieux à une analyse empirique (celle de Ohlin). Dans ces condi­
tions, il devient important de chercher à spécifier clairement les liens qui
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unissent ces deux définitions pour déterminer si elles sont équivalentes et 
dans quelles conditions elles peuvent l’être.
2. Lien entre la rareté factorielle au sens de Léontief et de Ohlin
Dans cette deuxième section, nous allons nous efforcer de déterminer 
la relation économique que l’on peut tisser entre les deux définitions de la 
rareté factorielle évoquées à la section 1, et ceci en essayant de nous abstrai­
re des hypothèses très restrictives qui ont été adoptées pour justifier la 
parfaite équivalence entre les deux approches présentées Pour mener à 
bien cette discussion, nous nous contenterons de postuler que les fonctions 
de production utilisées dans les deux pays considérés sont homogènes de 
degré 1, ce qui constitue en soi l’originalité de notre approche basée sur les 
conditions économiques les plus générales possibles.
Pour établir aisément ces liens, il nous suffira de préciser la part de la 
rémunération du capital dans l’économie k (part désignée fk) dans le produit 






Pxk̂ k +  Pyk̂ k
prix du bien X  dans le pays k 
quantité produite du bien X  dans le pays k 
quantité produite du bien Y dans le pays k 
prix du bien Y dans le pays k
(3)
En effet, à partir de cette expression fk, nous pouvons exprimer le lien 
entre (w/r)k et (K/L)k de la manière suivante:
w kL k =  R  -  rkKk (4)
w kL k _  R 
rkK k rkK k
' Pour certifier l’équivalence des deux définitions, il faut supposer que les deux pays sont 
caractérisés par des goûts et des fonctions de production parfaitement identiques, ainsi que 
l’absence de renversement des intensités factorielles.
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donc w 
c r  Jk
et finalement ( ~ )  ~  “  1 j
En partant de cette relation très simple, transcrite à l’équation 5, nous 
pouvons émettre dès lors les conditions d’équivalence ou de divergence des 
définitions proposées par Ohlin et par Léontief, et ceci dans un cadre 
théorique où nous avons réussi à nous libérer des hypothèses trop restricti­
ves imposées généralement sur les fonctions de production et les préférences 
supposées identiques entre les deux pays. Ces conditions peuvent se résumer 
en trois propositions qui forment un théorème original:
1. Si fA =  fB, la relation est dépourvue d’ambiguïté; les deux appro­
ches sont parfaitement équivalentes. En d’autres termes, si la part du revenu 
des capitalistes est la même dans les pays considérés, les deux définitions de 
la rareté factorielle conduisent exactement au même résultat, quelles que 
soient les caractéristiques postulées au niveau de le demande et même si les 
fonctions de production utilisées ne sont pas strictement identiques, mais 
seulement homogènes de degré 1.
2. En revanche, si les parts des revenus factoriels dans le produit 
national divergent, nous ne pouvons plus observer cette relation univoque 
entre les deux approches comme la première proposition nous a permis de le 
montrer.
Si l’on suppose, par exemple, que fA <  fB, nous serons en présence de 
deux situations diamétralement opposées que nous allons traiter successi­
vement:
i. Nous commencerons par discuter, tout d’abord, de l’abondance 
en capital du pays A relativement à l’économie B. Dans ce premier cas 
d’espèce, nous pouvons montrer aisément que la rareté au sens de Léontief 
implique nécessairement la rareté factorielle définie par Ohlin. En effet,
sachant que > nous pouvons en déduire:
>
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( K ' ' w N
U  J U , B ,  r y
donc
( w 'i > f w )— —
V r J A 1 r ;
( 6)
En revanche, l’abondance en capital du pays A, au sens de Ohlin, ne 
saurait inférer avec certitude celle établie par le concept de Léontief. En 
effet, si (w/r)A >  (w/r)B, cette observation ne nous permet pas d’en déduire 
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On constate donc qu’il n’est plus possible dans ce deuxième exemple 
de mettre en exergue une relation claire d’implication entre le concept 
d’Ohlin et celui de Léontief.
Nous pouvons donc conclure de cette première analyse que si les 
capitalistes du pays A obtiennent une part plus restreinte du revenu national 
comparativement au pays B, et que, dans le même temps on constate que ce 
facteur de production est rare, en quantité, il en découle nécessairement que 
son prix en A est inférieur à sa rémunération en B.
En revanche, si nous observons un prix relatif du capital plus faible 
dans le pays A par rapport à B, cela ne nous autorise pas à affirmer que le 
capital est un facteur abondant (au sens de Léontief); on pourrait, en effet, 
fort bien imaginer que, malgré sa faible rémunération, le capital soit relative­
ment rare en quantités dans le pays A, ce qui ne contribue qu’à réduire 
encore sa part dans le revenu national. Dans ce cas particulier néanmoins les 
définitions de Ohlin et de Léontief son incompatibles.
ii. Dans le deuxième cas, nous envisagerons une abondance relati-
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ve de l’économie A en travail. Dans cette situation, les relations d’implica­
tions sont exactement inversées par rapport à la première proposition établie 
précédemment. En effet, nous pouvons montrer par le même procédé que la 
rareté en capital au sens de Ohlin induit cette fois la rareté au sens de 
Léontief, la réciproque n’étant pas forcément vraie. En effet, si l’on observe 
que (w/r)A <  (w/r)B, ce qui signifie que le pays A est pauvre en capital au 




Au contraire, on peut démontrer sans difficulté que la rareté au sens de 
Léontief n’implique pas nécessairement, dans cette situation particulière, la 
rareté au sens de Ohlin 2 *.
3. Finalement, si l’on observe, à l’opposé de la deuxième proposi­
tion discutée précédemment, que la part distributive du capital au sein de 
l’économie A s’avère supérieure à la participation du capital dans le revenu 
total du pays B, l’ordre des implications est inversé en regard de la proposi­
tion 2:
i. la rareté du travail définie par Ohlin implique la rareté au sens 
de Léontief, la réciproque n’étant pas forcément vraie.
H. la rareté du capital au sens de Léontief implique celle de 
Ohlin, la réciproque n’étant pas forcément vraie.
Nous illustrerons ces cas uniquement pour la première partie de la 
proposition 3 .i en considérant cette fois que fA >  fB. Sachant que ( w/r)A >  
(w/r)B (l’économie A est pauvre en travail au sens de Ohlin), cela nous 
permet d’en déduire la rareté au sens de Léontief:
2 La démonstration étant en tous points analogue à celle menée à l’équation (7) nous
éluderons ce développement fastidieux.






Pour résumer ces différents cas que nous avons illustrés, nous pouvons 
présenter un tableau synoptique qui permettra de saisir plus facilement le 
sens des implications entre les deux approches de la rareté factorielle que 
nous avons évoquées 3:
f  <  f
A B
f  >  f
A B




A abondant en K L => 0 
III
0 => L 
IV
3. Conclusions
Ces quelques développements nous permettent d’aboutir à un certain 
nombre de conclusions importantes que nous pouvons synthétiser en quel­
ques points particulièrement marquants:
1. L ’approche de la rareté factorielle proposée par Léontief consti­
tue incontestablement l’approche conceptuelle de la rareté la plus convain­
cante puisqu’elle repose sur une définition basée sur des quantités physiques 5
5 Pour alléger ce tableau, nous ne mentionnons que les implications certaines entre les 
deux définitions de la rareté factorielle.
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de travail et de capital détenues par les deux économies. En revanche, le 
concept d’Ohlin est basé sur une conséquence économique de la rareté 
factorielle et, de ce point de vue, il est incontestablement moins précis 
puisque attaché à une conséquence économique d’un état de fait.
2. En revanche, lorsque l’on aborde une analyse empirique, l’appro­
che de Ohlin est sans conteste beaucoup plus aisément applicable, basée 
qu’elle est sur des concepts facilement quantifiables, contrairement aux me­
sures des quantités physiques des facteurs de production.
3. Compte tenu de ces divergences constatées entre le concept d’Oh­
lin et de Léontief, il était important de chercher à définir, dans un cadre 
théorique le plus général possible, les liens économiques précis unissant ces 
deux définitions afin de mettre en exergue les conditions de leur équivalence 
ou, au contraire, de leur divergence quant à la notion de rareté factorielle.
Sur ce point particulier, nous avons apporté un éclairage nouveau 
puisque nous avons établi que ces deux concepts n’étaient équivalents que 
si la part distributive de chaque facteur (part aisément mesurable au niveau 
statistique) était parfaitement identique dans les pays concernés. C’est à 
cette seule condition que l’on peut effectivement postuler l’équivalence en­
tre l’approche de Léontief et celle de Ohlin, pour autant que l’on s’abstraie 
des hypothèses très restrictives imposées le plus souvent sur la demande 
essentiellement.
4. En revanche, dès que ces parts distributives diffèrent, on ne peut 
plus établir de relations dépourvues d’ambiguïtés entre ces deux approches, 
comme le tableau synoptique que nous avons construit nous permet de le 
constater.
En l’occurrence, si l’on discute de l’abondance d’une économie en un 
facteur de production quelconque, mais, dans le même temps, on observe 
que ce facteur obtient une part de revenu national inférieure à celle de 
l’autre pays (cadrans II et III du tableau synoptique), dans ce cas l’approche 
de Léontief implique la rareté au sens de Ohlin. Ce constat est facilement 
interprétable économiquement car si un pays détient une quantité importan­
te d’un facteur qui ne reçoit pourtant qu’une infime partie du revenu natio­
nal, cela signifie nécessairement que sa rémunération est relativement faible.
Au contraire, lorsque l’on débat de l’abondance d’un facteur qui détient 
une part importante du produit total relativement à l’économie partenaire 
(cadrans I et IV du tableau synoptique), la définition de Ohlin induit alors 
celle de Léontief. En effet, si un facteur obtient une rémunération relative­
ment faible et, malgré cela, il reçoit une part importante du revenu national, 
cela signifie nécessairement que la quantité physique de ce facteur dans le 
pays considéré est très importante. En revanche, le fait qu’un facteur abon­
dant perçoive une part considérable du produit total n’implique pas nécessai-
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rement que sa rémunération soit relativement faible par rapport à l’autre 
facteur.
5. Finalement, cette analyse nous permet de mettre en évidence la 
démarche qu’il faudrait s’efforcer de suivre pour mener une étude empirique 
de la rareté factorielle. Dans un premier temps, il s’agit d’établir clairement 
la part distributive du facteur capital (par exemple) dans chacune des écono­
mies considérées; par la suite, après avoir établi le rapport des prix des 
facteurs régnant dans chaque pays en état d’autarcie, on peut déterminer si 
la rareté mise en exergue par la définition d’Ohlin correspond bien à une 
pauvreté physique de ce facteur qui constitue l’approche la plus adéquate, au 
niveau théorique du concept de rareté.
En l’occurrence, si la part distributive d’un facteur est plus faible dans 
un pays donné, seule la rareté relative, au sens d’Ohlin, établie pour l’autre 
facteur de production (cadrans I et IV), permet d’assurer que la définition 
de Léontief soit respectée.
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THE NOTION OF FACTORIAL SCARCITY IN THE PURE THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The aim of this paper is to determine the relation between Leontief’s and 
Ohlin’s definitions of factorial scarcity. The first part of this note establishes a 
new mathematical relationship between these two approaches using a very 
general framework.
The second part is devoted to the determination of the economic conditions 
which would ensure the equivalence of these definitions. In particular, it is 
shown that, if the capital’s share of national income is identical in all the 
countries, Leontief’s definition will be perfectly equivalent to Ohlin’s definition. 
In all other cases, the two definitions can lead to contradictory conclusions.
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BUSINESS TAXATION AND INDUSTRIAL LOCATION
by
H ong  H w ang  *  and C hao-ch en g  M ai * *
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to construct a theoretical model to examine 
the effects on a monopolist’s optimum location of a corporate income tax and 
an ad valorem sales tax. It will be shown that a corporate income tax has no 
effect on the optimum location, but an ad valorem sales tax does have and the 
extent and direction of this kind of tax effects depend upon the characteritics 
of the production function in question.
1. Introduction
Beginning with Weber’s (1929) seminal work, most of the theoretical 
studies had paid very little attention to the issue of how taxes affect indus­
trial location Nevertheless there were many empirical studies using either 
econometric or survey methods to examine this issue. Most of them found no 
significant relationship between taxation and industrial location. Early stud­
ies of this kind were summarized by Due (1961). More recently, Grieson 
et al. (1977) considered the impact of business taxes on manufacturing and
*  Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan.
* *  Institute of the Three Principles of the People, Academia Sinica, Nankang, Taipei,
Taiwan.
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Emerson (1973), Woodward (1973), Khalili, Mathur and Bodenhorn (1974), Miller and 
J ensen (1978), Mathur (1979, 1983), Mai (1981, 1984), Eswaran, Kanemoto and Ryan (1981), 
Martinich and Hurter (1982), and Hsu and Mai (1984). However, the exception may be the 
work of Fox (1978) and Woodward (1974).
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nonmanufacturing firms in the New York City region, and found that manu­
facturing firms were sensitive to local tax rates, while nonmanufacturing 
firms were not. So far, the debate over the effect of business taxation on 
industrial location still continues. It seems that one important step toward a 
solution to this problem is a detailed theoretical exploration of the locational 
effect of taxation.
The purpose of this paper is to construct a theoretical model to examine 
the effects on industrial location of a corporate income tax as well as an 
ad valorem sales tax. It will be shown that a corporate income tax has no 
effect on industrial location, but an ad valorem sales tax does have and the 
extent and direction of this kind of tax effects depend upon the characteris­
tics of the production function in question.
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. In the first, a 
simple location model without taxation is briefly reviewed. In the second, 
we investigate the effects on industrial location and input usage of a corpor­
ate income tax and an ad valorem sales tax. In the final section, we summar­
ize some conclusions and provide some policy implications.
2. A Basic Model
Assume that the location of a monopolist is limited to a set of points 
along a linear line of length as depicted in Figure 1. In this figure, I is the 
market site where the output of the firms is sold; J  is the site where the 
input M comes; x is the distance between the market and the monopolist’s 
location K.
I





Figure 1. Location in Linear Space
Next, for simplicity, it is also assumed that the firm uses raw material 
M as input to produce his output Q. The firm’s production function is 
specified as follows:
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(1) Q =  f(M )  with 4  a  >  0 and fMM =  <  0
where the subscripts denote derivatives.
Furthermore, the demand function for the firm’s product at the market 
site is given by:
(2) P =  P (Q) with PQ =  <  0
Under these conditions, the firm’s profit function with no tax is:
(3) n* =  [P (Q) — h (x) x] f{M ) — \m +  r (x) (t -  x)] M
=  [P (Q) -  « (*)] /(M ) -  [/» +  (x)] M
where 7r*  is the before-tax profit of the monopolist; h (x) and r (x) are the 
transport rates of Q and M respectively; u (x) =  h (x) • x; v (x) =  
r (x) • (s — x); m is the price of input at the input site.
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are given by:
(4) df  =  X  =  “  u J{M ) - v xM =  0
dx
(5) —— =  n*M -  [MR (Q) -  u (x)] fM -  [m +  v (x)] =  0 
dM
where MR (Q) =  P +  P q • Q is the marginal revenue of output.
Equation (4) indicates that profit maximization requires marginal trans­
port cost of output with respect to distance (i.e., location) be equal to that 
of input. Equation (5), on the other hand, states that the monopolist equates 
the net marginal revenue of product (net of transport cost of output) to the 
effective factor price (the sum of factor price and trasport cost of input).
So far, we have briefly reviewed the Weber-type of location-production 
problem as discussed in location literature and are ready to examine the 
effects of taxation on the firm’s location and input usage.
3. The Effect of Business Taxation on Industrial Location and Input Usage
In this section, we will consider the following two types of taxes: [A) a 
profit tax (i.e., a corporate income tax) and (B ) an ad valorem sales tax.
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(.A) A profit tax
If a profit tax is imposed, the monopolist is required to pay the 
government a specified proportion of the difference between his total reve­
nue and total cost. I f  the tax rate is jS (0 <  ¡3 <  1), then the monopolist’s 
after-tax profit is:
(6) =  (1 — /?) 7t*






=  (1 -  J») n*  =  0
=  (1 -  P) n% =  0
Since (1 — /? >  0, it follows from equations (7) and (8) that:
(7') n * =  0
(8') n*M =  0
Since the first-order conditions are the same as equations (4) and (5), 
the optimum location and input usage for the monopolist are unaffected.
(B) An ad valorem sales tax
Let the rate of an ad valorem sales tax be a  (0 <  a  <  1). Then the 
monopolist’s profit function becomes:
(9) 7T8 =  [P (Q) -  u (x)] f (M)  -  [ m  -  V  (x)] M -  aP (Q) f ( M )
=  7i* -  aP  (Q) f  (Af)
Setting the derivatives of (9) with respect to x and M respectively equal to 
zero obtains:
3 J
(10) -r— =  7C% =  7T* =  u J(M ) -  vJM — 0
OX
O—B
(11) ^  =  A  =  ~  a ‘ M R (Q) -fM
=  [MR (Q) -  «  W ]fM -  [m +  V  (x)] -  a  • MR (Q) • fM =  0
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Equation (10) is the same as equation (4), but equation (11) is dif­
ferent from equation (5). Recall that the marginal conditions without the 
imposition of tax are exactly the same as that with a corporate income tax. 
In what follows, the location and input usage without the imposition of tax 
will be compared with that with an ad valorem sales tax. At this moment, it 
is worth noting that if a =  0, equations (10) and (11) will be reduced to 
equations (4) and (5) immediately. To make such a comparison as men­
tioned above, taking the total differentials of (10) and (11) with respect to x, 






n UM — 
TcM
~  =  MR (Q) fMnxM
da D
- j -  — ~  MR (Q) fMnxx
da D
-  «x * • Q -  Vxx * M
[(1 -  a) MR (Q) -  u (*)] fMM +  (1 -  a) [2PQ +
-  « x / m  -  Vx
Pqq ■ Q] fu
D Tex T M
Twx nMM
Note here that the second-order conditions for this problem require 
that D >  0, nMM <  0 and nxx <  0 2.






This shows that the imposition of ad valorem sales tax will induce the 
monopolist to employ less input and hence to produce less output. This 
result is similar to that in the traditional nonspatial framework.
We now turn to equation (12). It is clear that the sign of
dx
da
2 For detailed discussion on this point, see Mai (1981).
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is indeterminate, as it depends upon the sign of nxM, and in turns upon the 
characteristics of the production function in question. To pursue our ar­
gument further, let us assume that the production function is homogeneous 
of degree n. Then equation (1) becomes:
(14) fM • M =  n • Q
Via (14), we can evaluate the sign of nxM as follows:
(15) nxM =  ^  ux • Q • (» -  1) |  0 iff n |  1 
Substituting (15) into (12) obtains:
(16) ~  |  0 iff n $  1
da
Thus, the optimum location for the monopolist is independent of an ad 
valorem sales tax if and only if the production function is constant returns to 
scale. Furthermore, the imposition of this tax would induce the monopolist 
to move its optimum location closer to (farther away from) the output 
market if and only if the production function is decreasing (increasing) 
returns to scale. The economic interpretation is as follows. As noted above, 
the imposition of an ad valorem sales tax will lead to a decline in the input 
usage. When the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale, a 
corresponding decrease in output will be less than the decrease in the input 
usage. As a result, the market pull is stronger than the input pull. Therefore, 
the monopolist will move its location towards the output market site. 3
3. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the effects on a monopolist’s location and 
production decisions of a corporate income (i.e., profit) tax as well as an ad 
valorem sales tax. It has been shown that a corporate income tax reduces the 
profit of a profit-maximizing monopolist, but does not affect his optimum 
location and input usage. On the contrary, an ad valorem sales tax does exert 
some influence on the optimum location and input usage. Specifically, the 
imposition of an ad valorem tax will necessarily result in a smaller input 
usage and hence output. In addition, the optimum location of the monopo­
list is invariant with respect to the imposition of an ad valorem sales tax if 
and only if the production function is homogeneous of degree one.
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However, this tax would lead the monopolist to move its optimum location 
closer to (farther away from) the output market if and only if the production 
function is decreasing (increasing) returns to scale.
In reality, the significance of tax effect on actual location decisions is 
difficult to assess; it might depend upon the tax structure and the nature of 
the production function in question. Of course, the impact of taxation must 
be analyzed in a more subtle and more comprehensive way. Nevertheless, 
even our simplified model can cast a light upon the nature of location 
decision under different types of taxation.
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IMPOSTE SULLE IMPRESE E LOCALIZZAZIONE DELLE ATTIVITÀ
Il lavoro indaga circa gli effetti delle imposte sui profitti e delle imposte ad 
valorem sulle vendite, sopra le decisioni produttive e di localizzazione di un’impre­
sa monopolistica. Si dimostra che un’imposta sul reddito d’impresa riduce il 
profitto di un monopolista massimizzatore del profitto, ma non influisce sulla 
localizzazione ottimale e sull’ottima utilizzazione degli input. Al contrario un’impo­
sta ad valorem sulle vendite esercita la sua influenza sulla ottimalità di localizzazio­
ne e di impiego dei fattori. In particolare l’applicazione di un’imposta ad valorem 
darà luogo necessariamente a minore utilizzazione degli input e quindi minore 
prodotto. Inoltre la localizzazione ottimale dell’impresa monopolistica è invariante 
rispetto all’introduzione di un’imposta ad valorem sulle vendite se (e solo se) la 
funzione di produzione è omogenea di primo grado. Tuttavia è possibile conclude­
re che una tale imposta condurrà il monopolista a spostare la località ottimale più 
vicino (più lontano) al mercato del prodotto se e solo se la funzione di produzione 
presenta rendimenti decrescenti (crescenti) di scala.
In realtà l’importanza dell’effetto dell’imposta sulla effettiva decisione di 
localizzazione è difficile da stabilire: potrà dipendere dalla struttura d’imposta e 
dalla natura della funzione della produzione in questione. Benché si richieda 
ulteriore analisi, anche un modello molto semplificato (qual è quello che qui si 
presenta) sembra capace di offrire utili indicazioni sulla natura delle decisioni di 
localizzazione con diversi regimi fiscali.
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SOVIET AGRICULTURE:
THE PROBLEMS AND THEIR CAUSES. PROSPECTS
by
T a s s o s  F a k io l a s  *
Abstract
The essay deals with the main problems of Soviet farming. An attempt is 
made to explain the causes why the USSR, being the biggest producer of 
fertilizers, tractors and other agricultural machines and with the biggest farms 
in the world, and having at its disposal more specialists in agriculture than any 
other country, is so far behind the West in labour productivity, while the per 
capita consumption of food is much lower than the rational norms.
The writer of this essay tries also to explain why the Soviet Union has 
not any prospects, at least till the end of our century and the beginning of the 
next, to catch up with the USA and other advanced countries in labour 
productivity as far as the agricultural sector is concerned.
I . T h e  P r o b l e m s
The present problems of the Soviet Union in the agricultural sector are 
mainly the following: a) the low level of labour productivity; b) the inabil­
ity of the sector to secure enough food for the population, and c) the need 
to import big quantities of agricultural products, first of all grains.
*  Counsellor of the Ministry of National Economy, Athens (Greece). As there are many 
differences between the Soviet and Western statistics and in order to make the data compa­
rable, they are all taken from Soviet sources. There is only one exception (p. 259), a source of 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), of the United Nations. The writer’s book (Fakio­
las, 1982) which is used in the text as a source, is based on Soviet data.
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1. Productivity
In 1928, when the collectivization began to be implemented (the deci­
sion was taken in December 1927) and tens of thousands of kolkhoz were 
created, it was argued that the collective farm system should display the 
advantages of large scale production. Concretely, it should make it possible 
to develop agriculture on a modern industrial basis and achieve the highest 
productivity in the world.
By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan (1937) the Soviet Union 
became the country with the largest average agricultural holdings in the 
world. The number of state and co-operative farms was nearly 4,000 and 
242,000 respectively, compared to the 25,000,000 individual holdings in 
1927. The average agricultural holding of a kolkhoz was 485 ha against 20 
ha in the United States (Podkolzin, 1968, p. 259).
It was hoped that the USSR, having at its disposal such big farms, 
would play a leading role in the agricultural sector as far as labour productiv­
ity was concerned. In fact, the opposite happened. The lag of the Soviet 
Union behind the advanced countries in the West is especially great in 
agriculture, where, according to Soviet estimates, the labour productivity in 
the latter is much higher than in the former. In 1966-1978 and in 1966- 
1982 if the level of USA was 100, the level of USSR was 20-25 (The 
National, 1983, p. 57; Statistical Service of USSR, 1983, p. 62).
However, the difference in labour productivity is still greater than the 
one the Soviet data show.
In 1971-1982 and in the last five years, the average agricultural produc­
tion of the USSR was 85 per cent of that of the USA. The USSR is “far 
behind” the USA in the output of grain, fruits and especially meat (Year­
book USSR, 1983, p. 112). At the same time, the Soviet agriculture em­
ployed 24.6 min persons (1982), (Fedorov, 1983, p. 81), against about 3,5 
min. persons in USA (1975) or 20-25% of the labour force in USSR (in 
1970 - 25% , in 1975 - 23% , in 1980 - 1982 - 20% ), (Statistical Service of 
USSR, 1983, pp. 61, 161), compared with 3.5%  of the labour force 
(1975), of USA (Aperyan, 1976, pp. 123, 126). Considering all the above 
mentioned as well as the fact that the Soviet agriculture does not include 
fishing, we can conclude that in USA the productivity is not 4-5 but 6 and 
more times higher than in USSR.
2. The Food Shortage
The shortage of foodstuff began soon after the realization of the deci­
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sion for massive collectivization. Concretely, from 1928 serious difficulties 
occurred in the supply of cities with foodstuff, while from 1929 the intro­
duction of coupons for the distribution of bread, sugar and other items 
became necessary (Gladkov, 1977, T. 3, p. 451). Because of the lack of 
bread, its price “was increased 4-6 times” (Trifonov, 1975, p. 256).
With the overfulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in 1932, the situa­
tion was not improved. Despite the fact that the system of coupons was in 
force, there were interruptions in the supply of the city shops with foodstuff 
(Borisov et al., 1975, p. 291).
As regards the food situation during the war, it is enough to quote the 
following facts: while the salaries remained at about the same level, the 
prices of the urban markets surpassed (1943) the pre-war level 13 times 
(Paspelov, 1960, T. 6, p. 77). In the black market the prices were much 
higher. For example, one kilogram of potatoes was sold at 45 rubles and a 
small piece of sugar — at 10 rub. (Erenburg, 1967, vol. 9, pp. 335, 379). 
Even in the countryside the food problem was acute. In 1942 for example, 
the kolkhoz gave to each of its members an average of 129 rub., 100 kg 
grain and 30 kg potatoes for the whole year (Kim, 1974, vol. X, p. 288).
The food shortage and the bad nutrition of the Soviet people continued 
even after the war (Podkolzin, 1968, p. 312; Pravda, 25.2.1976, p. 6; 
Kommunist, 1976, No. 16, p. 13; Kommunist, 1979, No. 17, p. 15; Pravda, 
16.7.1981, p. 1).
In the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI 
Congress of the Party (1981) it was recognized that “difficulties in supply­
ing the population with food still exist” and that to solve the problem of 
securing uninterrupted food supplies to the population it is necessary to 
work out a special food programme (Brezhnev, 1981, pp. 79-80).
It is worth noting that the administrative bodies of the country are 
seriously concerned with “the irregular supply of consumer items” (Danilov, 
1980, p. 119).
The XX IV  Congress of the CPSU (1971) “elaborated a scientific pro­
gramme of the economic, social and cultural development of the Soviet 
society” and defined the new Five-Year Economic Plan as “a major increase 
in living standards” (The CPSU, 1980, pp. 68-69). Although “the main 
object” of all the Five-Year Plans, starting with the very first, has been and 
continues to be “the improvement of the Soviet people’s living standards” 
(Danilov, 1980, p. 23), till now it has not been possible to secure a satisfac­
tory level of nutrition.
In USSR the average diet is sufficient in terms of caloric content, but 
not in terms of protein. Concretely, the consumption of potatoes, bread and
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Table 1
PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF BASIC AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS IN USSR AND RATIONAL NORM (kg)
Rational Actual level of consumption in Plan
Products Consumption
Norms 1975 1980 1981 1982 1980-82 1990
Meat and meat products............... 82 57 58 57 57
(average)
57 70
Milk and dairy products............... 434 316 314 304 295 304 335
Egg (Pieces)...................................... 292 216 239 247 249 245 263
Vegetables and Melons.................. 146 89 97 99 101 99 130
Fruits.................................................. 113 39 38 40 42 40 68
Potatoes.............................................. 97 120 109 104 110 108 110
Bread and bread products............ 120 141 138 137 137 137 135
S o u rc e s : Morozov, 1977, p. 214; T he National, 1983, p. 411; CMEA, Secretariat, 1981-83, p. 55-57, Statistical 
Service of USSR, 1983, pp. 42, 187; Bogolyubov, 1983, p. 30.
Table 2
IMPORTS IN USSR OF GRAIN, MEAT AND MEAT PRODUCTS IN 1972-1982
Products 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Grain (min. tons) * ......................................... 15.5 23.9 7.1 15.9
Of which wheat.............................................. 8.1 15.2 2.7 9.1
Value of grain (min. rub.).......................... 733 1146 535 1923 2323 1028 1655 2254 3176 4815 4218
Of which wheat.............................................. 424 749 226 1164 835 670 698 1003 1868 2492 2834
Animals for slaughter (thous. tons)*........ 70 72 147 260
Value (min. rub.)............................................ 31 32 85 137 76 86 52 89 99 127 133
Meat and meat products (thous. tons) 131 129 515 515 361 617 183 611 821 980 939
Value (min. rub.)............................................ 80 82 361 356 286 516 177 555 883 1185 1036
* After 1975 data for imports in quantity are not given. 
S o u rce : The E x te rn a l, 1973-1982.
bread products is far above the rational norms, while the level of consump­
tion of products of animal protein is far below them. “The growth in animal 
products is still insufficient judging by the per capita consumption standards 
recommended by Soviet Scientists” (Yearbook, USSR, 1984, p. 130). The 
structure of consumption is worse in vegetable and especially in fruits, 
where the average level of consumption is nearly 3 times below the rational 
norm.
The most vivid proof that the Soviet agriculture has been unable to
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grow enough to feed the population is the fact that the USSR has been 
turned into a net importer of food, especially grain and meat from the 
Western countries.
The imports of cereals and meat increased from 733 and 80 min. rub. 
in 1972 to 4,218 and 1,036 min. rub. in 1982 respectively (The External, 
1973-82, pp. 11, 91).
In 1981-1982 the average yearly output of grain is estimated at 170 
min. tons (official data are not available), about 60 min. tons less than the 
plan provided. The import of grain is estimated at 35-40 min. tons yearly.
Before the October Revolution and the First World War Russia was 
an important exporter of grain. Specifically, in 1913 Russia exported more 
than 9 min. tons of grain (Genin, 1970, p. 139).
At the X X II Congress (1961) the leader of the CPSU expressed the 
assurance that the Soviet Union “will conquer such a position in the world 
market of grain that will oblige imperialists to understand how our agricul­
ture is developing” (Materials, 1961, p. 156).
Indeed, the Soviet Union conquered a prominent place in the world 
market of grain, but not as an exporter as it was expected, but as an 
importer.
II. T h e  C a u s e s  o f  t h e  P r o b l e m s
According to Soviet historiography the reasons for the shortage of 
foodstuffs and the low standard of living of the Soviet people are mainly 
three: The need for a quick industrialization (Danilov, 1980, pp. 12, 33), 
the imperialist danger (Tetiusev, 1978, p. 109; Marushkin, 1972, p. 99) 
and the unfavourable weather conditions (Brezhnev, 1975, p. 21; Pravda, 
25.2.1976 and 5.3.1981).
With the industrialization of the country and the transformation of the 
Soviet Union to a superpower, the sole argument for the insufficiency re­
mained the unfavourable weather conditions. In 1981 the leader of the 
CPSU said: “Long experience shows that bad weather for agriculture occurs 
to us every two years” (Kommunist, 1981, No. 17, p. 5). The years during 
which Nature has been kind to the Soviet farmer “may be literarily counted 
on one’s fingers” (Morozov, 1977, p. 18).
However, the real causes for the shortage of foodstuff have nothing or 
very little to do with the unfavourable weather conditions. It suffices to say 
that only inadequacy in food supply to the population on the way from the 
farm to the shop “inflicts as much damage on stocks of food and raw
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materials as drought or other whims of nature” (Yearbook USSR, 1983, p. 
114).
If USSR has not solved its food problem, has such a low labour 
productivity, and has not managed to offer to its people what even the 
small-scale individual peasant household of the less developed countries of 
Europe has managed to offer, it is because the laws of economic and social 
evolution were violated.
The causes of the crisis in the Soviet agriculture are mainly the follow­
ing: a) The unripeness of the objective conditions for the socialization of the 
agricultural sector, b) The implementation of forcible methods for the a- 
chievement of collectivization, c) The lack of incentives and opportunities 
to develop creative initiatives.
1. Unripeness of Objective Conditions
When the decision for the collectivization was taken (December 1927), 
the technical basis of the Soviet agriculture was very feeble. Till then, the 
Soviet Union had produced less than 2400 tractors, while the production of 
combines had not yet begun. (It began in 1930 with 374 pieces; The 
National, 1956, pp. 75, 77). It is worth mentioning that in 1928 only 
0.2-1% of the work for the production of cereals was done by mechanic 
means (The National, 1958, p. 492).
In 1928 the productive capacity of collective farms was very low. 
There were only 5 heads of cattle per collective farm, 2 pigs and 0.2 
tractors. Even by the mid 1930, when collectivization was almost completed 
and eight-tenths of the land under cultivation were associated with collective 
farms, there were only 44 heads of cattle per collective farm, 15 pigs and 
0.8 tractors, i.e. less than a tractor (Morozov, 1977, p. 66).
As regards the cultural level of the Soviet people, it is enough to say, 
that in 1926 45%  of the urban population (Borisov et ah, 1975, p. 187) 
and of the rural population 43%  of men and 66%  of women were illiterate 
('The CPSU, 1980, p. 33).
The Soviet leaders did not realize that to run a large farm efficiently 
involved the existence of many educated persons, who have acquired techni­
cal skills and master the art of management and marketing.
Stalin and his followers did not realize that in a massive collectiviza­
tion it was necessary to solve not only economic, but also moral and psycho­
logical problems, that the latter are much more difficult than the former and 
that, if the building of a collective farm takes several months, to remodel the
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way of thinking of tens of millions of farmers, born under the system of 
private ownership, might take many decades and even centuries.
It has to be reminded that it was only in 1861 that serfdom was 
abolished in Russia, and that the land was really distributed among the 
peasants only after the October Revolution, when 150 million hectares were 
confiscated from owners of large estates and the Tzar’s family.
2. Implementation of Forcible Methods
The Soviet peasants did not enjoy the land they received without 
payment in result of the Revolution. Some years later they were obliged to 
give this land back, together with the land they had before the Revolution 
(Balatski, Talalayev, 1980, p. 7-64).
That the alienation of Soviet peasantry from the means of production 
was forcible is evidenced by the following facts:
As it is shown on Table 3, in the period 1929-1933, 780,000 families
Table 3
COLLECTIVIZATION OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS, 





households % of 
the total
Collectivization 





1913 =  100
Index of animal 
production 





1928 1.7 2.3 124 137
1929 3.9 4.9 121 129 330
1930 23.6 33.6 117 100
1931 52.7 67.8 114 93 370
1932 61.5 77.7 107 75 30
1933 101 65 50
Source-. T he N atio n a l, 1956, p. 99 and 1958, pp. 346-347; Statistical Service o f USSR, 1971, p. 33, D anilov, 
1970, p. 239; G ladkov, 1977, p. 377.
were deported. To this number must be added those who were deported 
before and after this period, as well as 200,000 families which were selfliqui- 
dated. The leaders of these families escaped because they were wanted 
(Danilov, 1970, p. 239). During collectivization more than one million 
families with about five million members were deported to the remote 
regions of the North, the Far East, Siberia and Kazakhstan (Kim, 1974, p. 
259; Trifonov, 1975, pp. 343, 371).
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The above mentioned official data may not support the assurance that 
“man is the most precious capital of Soviet society” (Kosolapov, 1983, p. 
82). Also, they may not support the validity of the arguments that in the 
case of peasants was applied “cooperation on a voluntary basis”, that “this 
was the way the socialist property of collective farms appeared” (Socialism: 
Theory and Practice, 1983, p. 61), and that the collectivization of farms was 
“gradual and voluntary” (Abalkin, 1980b, p. 25), when it is recognized that 
the “specific features of this revolution (as the collectivization is called - 
T.F.) was that it was made from ‘above’, with the initiative of the state 
authority. Stalin elaborated and fulfilled practically the theory of collectiviza­
tion” (Alexandrov-Galaktionov, 1950, p. 133).
3. The Consequences
The massive and forcible collectivization, before the necessary prerequi­
sites had ripen, had negative repurcussions on the development of agricul­
ture. As Table 3 shows, the level of production fell to the point at which it 
was 20 years before. Animal production suffered more. Its level fell rapidly 
and was about two times lower than it was three-four years before the 
massive collectivization and 1/3 lower than in the prewar time.
The misuse of the means of production in agriculture (machines, ferti­
lizers, building, land, etc.) occurred not only in the period of collectivization. 
It continued even after the “victory of socialism” in USSR (Fakiolas, 1982, 
p. 254-258).
It is recognized that “the fertilizers are not protected carefully, they are 
left in the open air and spoiled by bad weather conditions” (Pravda, 
15.2.1982, p. 1). At the same time many spare parts are used as scraps, 
while a lot of tractors are not working because of lack of spare parts (Pravda 
26.9.1975, p. 1). Because of the lack of machines, the execution of the basic 
agricultural operations demand double time than the optimal (Kim, 1974, p. 
115).
Investigations carried out in many regions of the country showed that 
“40-70% of tractors and motors are given for general repair having defects, 
which could be remedied with the change of one or two spare parts” 
{Pravda, 29.11.1973).
It was estimated that in 1977 in Belorussia and Ukrain 7 million 
working days were lost because of the misuse of agricultural machines 
(Voprosi Ekonomiki, 1979, p. 100).
Some Soviet scientists are especially worried about the uneconomic use
SOVIET AGRICULTURE 2 5 7
of land. They argue that “land has its price and sometimes value as well, 
which should be defined by the costs of labour and capital” (Usakova-Fac- 
tor, 1968, p. 150).
The land resources of USSR account for 14 per cent of the world’s 
agricultural land and 16 per cent of the arable land (Novoye Vremya of 
Moscow, 1983, No. 8, p. 18). The land in use exceeds 604 min hectares. Of 
this area, Soviet farmers cultivate 226 min each year, collect hay on nearly 
43 min, and place about 300 min under pasture (Morozov, 1977, p. 14).
There are 2,3 ha of farmland per person and every collective (State) 
farm has on average 537 (557) farm workers, 41 (58) tractors and 6,7 
(18,9) thousand ha farmland (Sarkisyants, 1980, p. 123).
No one doubts that large farms are characterized by increased technical 
facilities, application of chemical and biochemical research, better conditions 
and opportunities for increasing accumulation, lower per-unit cost of farm 
products. But for achieving high productivity this is not enough. This is 
confirmed by the following facts: USSR has more agricultural area and 
produces more tractors, combines (in terms of total engine capacity), agricul­
tural machines and fertilizers than any Western country (The National, 
1983, pp. 66, 68; ‘New Times' of Moscow, 1983, No. 8, p. 19) and 1.8 
min. specialists with high education (Voprosi Istorii CPSU, 1983, p. 114).
It has to be added that the educational level of workers and peasants in 
the countryside is very high. The number of collective farmers with second­
ary and higher education has risen to more than 60 per cent of the total, 
(,Socialism: Theory and Practice, 1983, No. 1, p. 58). It is worth mentioning 
that in the villages are working 6 million members of the party -  one third 
of the whole (Voprosi Istorii CPSU, 1983, p. 118).
Despite the above mentioned data, the Soviet farms cannot compete 
with Western farms, although the former are the biggest in the world and 
the latter in their overwhelming majority consist of small and medium size 
households.
The Soviet leaders, instead of encouraging the private initiative and 
thereafter carefully and patiently restructuring small-scale production 
through cooperation, from its lower forms (consumer, marketing and credit 
co-operatives) to its higher form (producer co-operatives), actually do the 
opposite. In less than a decade they passed all the above mentioned stages, 
despite the fact that the USSR “lacked experience in restructuring agricultur­
al production and the entire way of life of peasants along new lines” (Abal­
kin, 1980b, p. 25). Concretely, in 1937, 98.5 per cent of the agricultural 
production (including income of individual households of Kolkhoz mem­
bers) was produced by the state and co-operative sectors of the economy,
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against 3.3 per cent in 1928 and 1.5 in 1924. The Soviet leaders now try to 
encourage the private initiative. “The state assists the population in cultivat­
ing the personal land plots” (Abalkin, 1980b, p. 38). The CPSU took 
measures for the development of the subsidiary plots of rural dwellers 
(Brezhnev, 1981, p. 84).
In 1939 the percentage of individual peasants and craftsmen of the 
total population fell to 2.6%  against 74.9%  in 1928 (The National, 1978, 
p. 39 and p. 9). This means that the percentage decreased nearly 29 times. 
In the same year, the XV III Congress (1939) stressed that Socialist Society 
“had been mainly built” in the Soviet Union, while the XXI Congress 
(1959) stated that socialism “had triumphed fully and decisively” in the 
USSR (The CPSU, 1980, pp. 51, 59).
In fact, the collectivization led to excessive concentration and amalga­
mation and to creation of uncontrollable farms. At the same time, coopera­
tive farms are engaged in many branches. The result is that the cost of 
agricultural produce “remains virtually unchanged despite the steady annual 
increase of capital investment by the state” (Yearbook USSR, 1983, p. 115).
The above data show that there is not any rational utilization of public 
wealth — material, financial resources and most of all, human labour. The 
forcible alienation of Soviet peasants from their land and tools resulted in 
their apathy and unwillingness to work and assume responsibility.
III. P r o s p e c t s
1. Soviet Forecasts and Reality
For the last two decades the Soviet leaders avoid to make any forecasts 
and define how and when the Soviet Union will surpass the Western coun­
tries in general and especially in agriculture. The reasons are obvious.
In 1930 the Resolution of the XVI Congress of the CPSU noted that 
on the basis of collectivization the Party will be able “to begin the 
fulfillment of the slogan ‘to catch up with and outstrip’ the capitalist 
countries not only in industry, but in agriculture too” (Vlasov, 1961, p. 93).
Three decades later, in 1959, the X X I Congress of the party expressed 
the assurance that in 1970 the USSR “will lead the world in the absolute 
volume of production, as well as in the per capita production” (The Extraor­
dinary, 1959, Vol. 2, p. 446).
The Resolution of the Congress argued that “in the agricultural sector
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the main purpose is to reach the adequate level of production for the 
complete satisfaction of the needs of the population as far as foodstuff is 
concerned” (The Extraordinary, 1959, Vol. 2, p. 436).
The next Congress of the Party (1961) estimated that in two decades 
the USSR “will surpass the economic level of the most advanced capitalist 
countries and will achieve the highest standard of living in the world” 
(.Materials, 1961, p. 141).
According to the third Programme of the CPSU (1964), in a decade 
the USSR should surpass the USA “in per capita production of the main 
agricultural products”, while in the second decade there should be “an 
adundance of goods for the total of the population” which should have the 
possibility to satisfy its needs “in food of high quality” (The Programme, 
1964, pp. 78, 93).
Table 4.
EXPECTED AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION OF 
MAIN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IN USSR
Products 
(in min. tons)
Expected Actual (average) Plan
1970 1980 1976-1980 1981-1982 1986-1990
Grain............ 229 295-311 205.0 170 * 250-255
Meat............. 25 30-32 14.8 15.3 20-20.5
Vegetables.... 47 55 30.0 28.5 37-39
Fruits............ 28 51 9.4 10.3 14-15
Source-. Materials, 1961, pp. 144, 153; Pravda, 28.2.1981; Statistical Service of USSR, 
1983, pp. 43, 117; CMEA Secretariat, 1981-83, pp. 194-199, 212.
*  Estimation of the FAO. Soviet data are not available.
As Table 4 shows, the actual production of main products in 1976- 
1980 was 0.5-5 times below the targets set for 1980. Specifically in grain 
0.5, in meat and vegetables 2 and in fruits 5 times below. It is worth saying 
that for all of the above mentioned products the targets set for 1970 were 
far from fulfillment in 1981-1982. They are not expected to be fulfilled 
(except for grain) even in 1986-1990.
As it was already mentioned, in 1971-82 the Soviet agricultural produc­
tion was about 85 per cent of the American level (The National, 1978, p. 
49; Statistical Service of USSR, 1983, p. 61). It is obvious that the target of 
surpassing the United States was not fulfilled not only in per capita produc­
tion, but even in volume.
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2. The Prospects in Productivity
It is estimated that 92 per cent of the entire able-bodied population of 
the USSR is employed in socialized production and that in the foreseeable 
future there will be a “sharp drop in the numerical growth of the labour 
resources as compared with the current decade” (Kosolapov, 1983, p. 62). 
At the same time, it is foreseen that by 1990 the rural population of the 
Soviet Union will be the 25-30 per cent of the total (Kosolapov, 1976, p. 
129), against 36 per cent in 1982 (Statistical Service of USSR, 1983, p. 7).
From the above it is clear that almost the only way for the increase of 
agricultural production in USSR is the increase in labour productivity.
As we have already seen, the forecasts of the X X I Congress that the 
USSR would “catch up and outstrip in the near future the USA in labour 
productivity” (The Extraordinary, 1959, Vol. 1, p. 113) has not been ful­
filled.
The prospects of USSR in labour productivity in agriculture do not 
seem too promising.
Although the State makes big capital investments in the production of 
new equipment and mineral fertilizers and the construction of land-improve­
ment systems, “labour consumption in agriculture is being reduced at a too 
slow rate” (Kosolapov, 1983, p. 65). In 1976-1980 the productivity in this 
sector increased by 15 per cent or by 2.83 per cent annually, against the 
period 1971-1975 and in the next period 1981-1985 it was expected to 
raise by 22-24 per cent (Pravda, 28.2.1981), or by 4.2 per cent annually.
The extrapolation of these data show that in case of an increase of 
2.83% yearly, the Soviet productivity will be 3 times higher in 25 years and 
in case of an increase of 4.2%  - 5 times higher.
From the above and having in mind the difference with USA concern­
ing productivity, we conclude that in both cases the Soviet Union has not 
any prospect to catch up with the now-a-days level of the American produc­
tivity in agriculture earlier than in the beginning of the next century. 
However, it is worth mentioning that in the previous decades the American 
productivity increased quicker than the Soviet one, since the lag in the 
productivity between the USSR and USA has widened. As we have already 
seen, the productivity in the USA agriculture is now, always according to 
Soviet data, 4-5 times higher than in USSR against 3 times two decades 
earlier (The Extraordinary, 1959, Vol. 1, p. 113). And this occurred despite 
the fact that “question of ensuring high rates of labour productivity have 
always been a key component of the Party’s economic policy” (Kosolapov, 
1983, p. 82).
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3. The Quality
As we already know, the Soviet leaders do not specify when the USSR 
is expected to surpass the Western countries. At the same time, it is argued 
that this task is more of a qualitative than a quantitative character. “In the 
foreseeable future the USSR will catch up and outstrip the leading capitalist 
countries as far as the basic economic indicators ... are concerned. The 
accent is now more and more on efficiency and quality (Danilov, 1980, p. 
117).
However, it is well known, that indeed, in the latter the lagging of the 
Soviet Union is the biggest one. It is recognized that “the quality of market­
able agricultural production remains low” (Yearbook USSR, 1983, p. 113), 
despite the fact that the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU had underlined that the Tenth Five-Year Plan (1975-1980) “ ... 
should, above all, be a five-year plan o f. quality” (Brezhnev, 1975, p. 
509-510).
Because of the low quality of agricultural products the CMEA (COME- 
KON)-member countries decided to co-operate until 1990 “for a comprehen­
sive solution of the problem of raising the quality of foodstuff” (CMEA 
Secretariat, 1982, p. 32).
It is not easy to forecast when the Soviet Union will be in a position to 
secure its population with a diet similar to that of the advanced Western 
countries. It is estimated that the Soviet diet shall become rational if the 
overall volume of Soviet agricultural output increases “by 2-2.5 times” (Mo­
rozov, 1977, p. 213).
It is possible that the effective use of the productive factors might 
permit the USSR to satisfy its basic needs of foodstuff. But this, surely, will 
be more of a quantitative than of a qualitative character.
There is no doubt that “high quality means ... the fuller satisfaction of 
society’s requirements” (Kosolapov, 1983, p. 84). However, high quality 
comes after quantity. But as Table 1 shows, in 1990, even if the plan has 
totally been fulfilled, the level of consumption in meat and meat products, 
in milk and dairy products, in eggs, vegetables and fruits will be considera­
bly below the rational norms.
Under such circumstances, it is not possible to achieve high quality 
before achieving full satisfaction of society’s requirements in quantity.
4. The Food Programme
In order to streamline agricultural production, eliminate bottlenecks
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and food shortages, stop the heavy drain on hard currency reserves for grain 
purchases and to offset domestic shortfalls a long-term plan was elaborated: 
The Food Programme (Kouznetsov, 1984 pp. 3-19).
The prior growth of the production of food and agricultural raw mate­
rials is regarded “as the country’s most important social and economic objec­
tive” (Yearbook USSR, 1983, pp. 112-113).
It is obvious that the fulfillment of the Food Programme by means of 
extensive methods is not possible. As we have already seen, the rural popula­
tion in USSR, as well as in the other industrial countries, will continue to 
diminish. As regards the land resources, although the agricultural and the 
arable lands of the Soviet Union in relation to the total area of the country 
account only for 37 and 10 per cent respectively, the reserves of land 
suitable for cultivation are limited (Bystrakov, 1983, p. 18). At the same 
time, population is growing and more and more land is required for towns, 
roads and factories.
Under these circumstances, the only way to increase the production of 
agricultural products is to use intensive methods. For this purpose, the 
Soviet government has made significant investments. Concretely, during the 
period 1971-1980, for the development of agriculture it invested more than 
300 billion rubles (Kommunist, 1981, No. 13, p. 36).
Having in mind “the unprecedented increase over the past three five- 
year plan periods in capital investment for further mechanization, land im­
provement and chemicalization of agriculture” (Kosolapov, 1983, p. 34) and 
the poor results of these investments, it is doubtful whether the new “big 
material and financial resources, which are being allocated for further devel­
opment of the agro-industrial complex” (Andropov, 1983, p. 5) and meliora­
tion (Economicheskaya Gazetta, No.21, 1984, p. 2, Moscow, in Russian; 
Krasnienkov, 1981, p. 4), will have any better results. In this respect, it has 
to be taken into account that the average return per unit of assets will 
continue to decline because the need to open up the Eastern and Northern 
areas, where there are manpower shortages and prevail rigorous conditions, 
demand far more spending on organizing production, along with vast ex­
penditure on developing the infrastructure.
Now-a-days, the highest level of labour productivity in agriculture is 
reached by means of agro-industrial integration, when the technologically 
interlinked production units are integrated into a single process, making it 
possible to repattern agriculture on a large scale, based on modern science 
and technology.
However, in USSR, the further development of higher forms of co­
operation where collective and state farms and industrial complexes merge
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and form large agro-industrial complexes may not solve the problem. De­
spite the socialization of the means of production five decades ago, as well 
as the application of all kinds of associations -  inter-collective-farm, inter- 
state-farm, collective-state-farms, the Soviet agriculture failed to be trans­
formed into a reliable source of food for the population. The establishment 
too of an all-Union Ministry of fruit and vegetables for the coordination of 
the branches engaged in the production, procurement, storage, processing 
and sales of produce may not solve the problem. In Western countries there 
are not such ministries, but the population is supplied normally in quantity 
and quality with such products.
The argument that the USSR shows the other countries of the world 
the way to solve their agricultural problems (Sarapov, 1976, p. 5) is not 
valid.
5. The Problem is Political
The main reason that the vast resources, allocated for the development 
of the agro-industrial complexes do not bear fruitful results, is that produc­
tion and labour relations do not correspond to the level of productive forces.
It suffices to say that at a time when the Soviet agriculture cannot 
supply the population with food and the country is importing tens of mil­
lions of tons of grain yearly, during half a century “there has not been a 
single case of bankruptcy of a collective or state farm” (Morozov, 1977, p. 
45) out of tens of thousands of such farms. Undoubtedly, since every farm 
can survive, there is no need for its directors and workers to work hard and 
to take any initiative. However, bad weather conditions experience has 
convincingly shown how effective the economic incentives are, even in cases 
of emergency. For example, in 1981, when a drought hit Nikolayev region 
in those farms, where the so called payment by the job system had been 
introduced (the machine operator’s earnings do not depend on the amount 
of work done according to job orders but on the final economic results 
achieved by his team), the yields of wheat were higher by up to one ton per 
hectare, or nearly 50 per cent (Yearbook USSR, 1983, pp. 114-115).
The new law, too, for the increase of the working groups’ role in the 
management of firms, kolkhoz and organizations may not change the exist­
ing situation, since it provides that the problems will be solved through the 
united efforts of the administration, the party, the Trade Unions and the 
Communist Youth’s Organization (Pravda 18.6.1983, p. 2 and 19.6.1983, 
p. 3). This means that the party organizations will continue, as before, to
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play the leading role. It is recognized that the main work in the villages for 
the realization of the Food Programme “will be carried out in the regional 
Committees of the Party” (Glinskii, 1983, p. 119). The above do not leave 
any room for independence and for the development of any initiative, de­
spite the contrary decisions taken by the Congresses of the CPSU. Concrete­
ly, in 1966 the X X III Congress underlined the need to make better use of 
economic methods and incentives in managing the economy, to improve 
planning and “increase the economic initiative and independence of ... collec­
tive and state farms” (The CPSU, 1980, p. 67). The results, however, were 
very poor, if not negligible and the prospects do not look bright.
The continuing allocation of scarce resources on a priority base — 
nearly 15 per cent of the GNP — to the military sector, difficulties with 
labour supply, combined with an overall lack of effective labour discipline, a 
low technological base in industry, the poor performance of the transport 
system, especially of Soviet Railways, continuing bureaucratic rigidity, poor 
management and adherence to orthodox economic methodology (Fakiolas, 
1982, chap. VI-VIII) — all these are factors which influence negatively the 
course of Soviet economy, including agriculture, and do not permit the 
achievement of the primary objective, which is to reverse the long-term 
trend towards lower economic growth.
For the purpose of achieving an economical exploitation of the existing 
human and material resources in Soviet agriculture, it is necessary to solve 
the following problems:
a) To find effective forms of labour organization and establish ma­
terial and moral criteria for stipulating creativity and efficiency.
b) To develop managerial skills and techniques and adopt rapidly 
scientific and technological inventions in the process of production.
c) To improve radically railway and high-way transport and supply 
systems.
However, the solving of the above mentioned problems and the achieve­
ment of radical positive changes in Soviet agriculture (as well as in the 
other sectors of economy) would require a series of fundamental political 
decisions, inter alia the definition of the extent to which increased degree of 
decentralization and flexibility in the system can be compatible with the 
stability of the system itself.
Developments since Chernienko assumed leadership indicate that al­
though there is a change in the style of public decision of economic policy, 
there are not essentially any new starting points for changes in the Soviet 
economic policy in the sense of structural economic reforms (Chernienko, 
1984, p. 19). It is evident that apart from criticizing existing grievances and
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analyzing the various problems, the leadership will avoid using fundamental­
ly new means to resolve them and that it will confine itself to efforts for the 
improvement of the performance of the existing system. The changes to be 
made will be rather marginal than radical.
C o n c l u s io n s
The crisis in the Soviet agriculture has a permanent character and its 
causes are connected with the collectivization from the very beginning. The 
lack of adequate foodstuff for more than half a century, the need of the 
country to import big quantities of agricultural products and first of all 
grain, show that the collectivization forced the Soviet agriculture to be put 
on unhealthy roots.
If the collective farms were built not coercively, but on the basis of 
economic laws, surely today the Soviet Union would have had an adundance 
of foodstuff and an agriculture with which no other country in the world 
would be able to be compared. But this could be achieved neither in the 
USSR, nor in any other country, but especially in the former, which lagged 
so many decades from the industrial countries. The laws of social and 
economic development did not permit this.
That is why, too, there are no prospects, at least in our century, for the 
agricultural sector of USSR to surpass the USA and other advanced coun­
tries in labour productivity and in quality of products.
It is obvious that the present economic problems of USSR in agricul­
ture, as well as in the other economic sectors, demand political solutions.
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L ’AGRICOLTURA SOVIETICA: I PROBLEMI, LORO CAUSE E PRO­
SPETTIVE
II problema attuale dell’agricoltura sovietica è legato alla bassa produttività 
cui consegue insufficiente disponibilità di alimenti e necessità di importazioni. 
Questo accade malgrado i buoni propositi della collettivizzazione i cui obiettivi, 
enunciati nel 1928, erano quelli di condurre l’agricoltura sovietica ai primi livelli 
mondiali per tecnologia e produttività. Fatto cento il livello statunitense, il livello 
sovietico è oggi 20-25 sulla base di dati sovietici (l’autore ritiene che tali dati 
sottostimino ampiamente il divario effettivo). In realtà è ben noto che problemi e 
difficoltà hanno cominciato a emergere affliggendo l’agricoltura sovietica all’indo­
mani stesso del processo di collettivizzazione. Secondo analisti sovietici le cause 
dei fenomeni qui discussi risiederebbero in: 1) rapidità dell’industrializzazione; 2) 
pericolo imperialistico e 3) situazione climatica e avverse condizioni meteoro­
logiche.
In realtà è ben noto che la collettivizzazione è stata una scelta imposta a un 
paese ben lungi dall’esser maturo ad accettarla: essa ha comportato l’utilizzo di 
metodi coercitivi imponenti e il risultato è stato la cancellazione di ogni sistema 
d’incentivo produttivo. Ancor oggi naturalmente, non soltanto la ripresa produtti­
va può essere prevista solo a lungo periodo, ma essa resta dipendente da scelte 
politiche di fondo.
RECENSIONI
Baranzini M.-Scazzieri R. (eds.): Foundations of Economics. Structures of Inquiry and Econom­
ie Theory, 1986, Oxford, Basii Blackwell, pp. 454.
Discutere sul tema delle strutture di indagine nella teoria economica e, più in generale, della 
conoscenza in economia è un compito assai impegnativo.
Mauro Baranzini e Roberto Scazzieri lo hanno fatto proponendo, rivolti soprattutto agli 
economisti di professione, una raccolta di saggi scritti da autorevoli economisti e riuniti in un 
volume dal titolo Foundations of Economics. Structures of Inquiry and Economie Theory, di cui 
sono i curatori.
Baranzini e Scazzieri nel loro ampio saggio introduttivo « Knowledge in Economics: A 
Framework » (pp. 1-87) delineano il programma scientifico e lo scopo del volume.
L ’idea principale che percorre l’insieme dei saggi proposti è che produzione e scambio sono i 
due temi fondamentali intorno a cui si sono andate sviluppando due distinte linee di ricerca che 
hanno caratterizzato la dinamica storica della teoria economica; la linea di ricerca dello scambio 
che tratta originariamente i problemi dell’allocazione e delle decisioni « razionali » degli 
individui, e la linea di ricerca della produzione che tratta l’organizzazione sociale, la produzione 
ed il mutamento strutturale.
II concetto di linea di ricerca è quindi cruciale per comprendere il significato dell’intero 
volume. Baranzini e Scazzieri intendono per linea di ricerca un insieme di teorie caratterizzate 
da ipotesi e concetti comuni, tali che ciascuna di esse si colloca quale avanzamento lungo una 
data traiettoria. Ciò implica che la teoria presa in considerazione dipenda da quelle precedente- 
mente formulate lungo la stessa linea e/o che tale teoria sia essenziale nella formulazione delle 
successive lungo la medesima traiettoria. È altresì importante sottolineare che distinte linee di 
ricerca possono avere numerosi punti in comune, poiché una data teoria può essere influenzata 
da teorie che appartengono alla linea di ricerca A ed essere, allo stesso tempo, essenziale alla 
formulazione di un’altra teoria, che appartiene alla linea di ricerca B.
Detto questo, risulta più chiaro lo scopo dichiarato dai due curatori di voler contribuire alla 
valutazione dell’opinione che la conoscenza in economia è associata con lo sviluppo concorrente 
di due distinte linee di ricerca, dello scambio e della produzione, ciascuna delle quali osserva la 
disciplina da angolazioni differenti, ha un diverso nucleo originario e « compete » con l’altra 
arricchendo il proprio nucleo originario con elementi della linea di ricerca concorrente.
La tesi di fondo sostenuta da Baranzini e Scazzieri che la conoscenza in economia, e più in 
generale la conoscenza scientifica, non possa e non debba ridursi ad un piatto unanimismo che 
esclude qualsiasi confronto dialettico fra linee di ricerca alternative e concorrenti a noi sembra 
pienamente condivisibile.
John Hicks e Luigi Pasinetti 1 sono gli ispiratori dell’approccio seguito dai nostri curatori, e
1 Cfr. in proposito H icks J., 1976, « ‘Revolutions’ in Economics » in Method and Appraisal
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non è un caso quindi che due loro saggi, « Is Economics a Science? » di Hicks e « Theory of 
Value — A Source of Alternative Paradigms in Economic Analysis » di Pasinetti, rispettivamen­
te aprano e chiudano la raccolta di contributi del volume. Affermano in proposito Baranzini e 
Scazzieri:
« Hick’s and Pasinetti’s viewpoints complement each other, in the sense that Pasinetti 
stresses the influence of external events on the internal dynamics of economic theory (see his 
associations between the phase of trade and mercantilism, the phase of industry and classical 
political economy); whereas Hicks stresses how changes in economists’ concentration of 
attention might also be independent of changes in the basic characteristics of economic life (see 
his explanation of the ‘triumph of catallactics’ which runs in terms of the intellectual superiority 
of the exchange over the production research line at the time when the overtaking took 
place) » 2.
Essi propendono quindi per una ricostruzione storica dell’analisi economica che valorizzi sia 
i fatti esterni (sottolineati da Pasinetti) sia quelli interni alla teoria economica (evidenziati da 
Hicks), collocandosi in tal modo in una posizione mediana non molto dissimile da quella 
assunta di recente da A. Quadrio Curzio e R. Scazzieri nel saggio « Sui momenti costitutivi 
dell’economia politica » 3.
Procedendo nella loro ricostruzione storica dell’analisi economica, ben documentata ed 
arricchita di citazioni di numerosi economisti del passato e contemporanei, Baranzini e Scazzieri 
fanno due acute osservazioni.
La prima è che il perdurare di modelli ideali alternativi che si riconducono alle linee di 
ricerca dello scambio e della produzione e la formulazione di teorie economiche rivali si può 
ricondurre in parte all’esistenza in economia di un doppio linguaggio, quello della disciplina 
scientifica ed il linguaggio ordinario dell’economia pratica; e che quindi teorie economiche rivali 
derivano la loro identità da un uso unilaterale dei termini economici del linguaggio ordinario, 
attribuendo a tali termini significati diversi.
La seconda osservazione è più profonda e riguarda l’identità stessa dell’economia e degli 
studiosi che ad essa si dedicano. La dinamica storica della conoscenza economica è stata infatti 
caratterizzata dall’intrecciarsi nel tempo di due distinte concezioni della disciplina. Da un lato 
una concezione pratica sottolineata soprattutto dalla scuola di pensiero neoclassica, ovvero da 
quegli economisti che seguono la linea di ricerca dello scambio (i « catalettici » di Hicks) per i 
quali l’economia rientra nella teoria generale delle azioni umane e dei comportamenti ottimizzan­
ti, diventando quindi prasseologia. Dall’altro una concezione speculativa tipica dell’economia 
politica classica, che ha portato avanti la linea di ricerca della produzione, la cui caratteristica 
distintiva è la ricerca di leggi oggettive, piuttosto che la formulazione di regole. L ’attenzione 
degli economisti aderenti a questa seconda concezione si incentra sul produrre e lo scambiare 
considerati come processi effettivi e reali, piuttosto che sulla produzione e lo scambio, concepiti 
come casi astratti di un comportamento premeditato. La teoria economica è così costruita quale 
insieme di conoscenze effettive piuttosto che quale insieme di regole pratiche, e ciò fa apparire 
la relazione mezzi-fini in una posizione di secondo piano4.
In conclusione, il volume riflette l’interesse dei curatori verso due tematiche: la persistenza
in Economics, a cura di S.J. Latis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 207-218; e 
Pasinetti L.L., 1965, « A New Theoretical Approach to the Problems of Economic Growth », 
in Econometric Approach to Development Planning, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 571-696.
2 Baranzini M.-Scazzieri R., op. cit., pp. 12-13.
5 Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 1984, pp. 37-76.
4 Baranzini M.-Scazzieri R., op. cit., pp. 27-28 e 59-61.
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in economia di concezioni teoriche divergenti, e la relazione che intercorre fra le concezioni 
teoriche riguardanti la scienza economica e gli schemi conoscitivi forniti da altre discipline. 
Riguardo al primo punto in particolare, risulta evidente la contrapposizione con coloro i quali 
affermano, invece, che l’economia è caratterizzata da un unico approccio e che la dicotomia 
scambio-produzione è inesistente o semplicemente pretestuosa. Christopher Bliss nel saggio 
« Progress and Antiprogress in Economie Science » riportato nel volume (pp. 363-376) è 
appunto il paladino di quest’ultima tesi.
La struttura del volume si compone di quattro parti, che assieme comprendono tredici saggi, 
oltre al già citato saggio introduttivo dei curatori.
I contributi della parte I, « Perspectives on economics and thè dynamics of knowledge », 
prendono in esame le relazioni che intercorrono tra economia ed altre forme di conoscenza. In 
questa parte I troviamo i saggi di John Hicks e di Bernard Schmitt.
I contributi della parte II, « The core and thè extensions of exchange-oriented theories », e 
della parte III, « The core and thè extensions of production-oriented theories », considerano 
rispettivamente la struttura logica delle linee di ricerca dello scambio e della produzione. Alcuni 
di questi contributi sono delle ricostruzioni storiche, a volte critiche, delle rispettive linee di 
ricerca; essi evidenziano tra l’altro il fatto che ogni linea di ricerca tende a generare tematiche 
di indagine che coprono l’intero dominio dell’economia. Altri sono dei veri e propri contributi 
« in progress » lungo la linea di ricerca preferita. Abbiamo quindi per la parte II i saggi di 
Maurice Allais, Michael Bacharach, Dieter Helm, Klaus Hennings; per la parte III i saggi di 
Nicholas Georgescu Roegen, Michael Landesmann, Alberto Quadrio Curzio, Krishna Bha- 
radwaj.
La parte IV, « From thè ancients to thè moderns: a reappraisal of thè dynamics of change 
in economie theory », con i saggi di Christopher Bliss, A. Quadrio Curzio — R. Scazzieri, e di 
Luigi Pasinetti, riconsidera criticamente la dualità scambio-produzione quale fondamentale 
quadro di riferimento per l’analisi economica e rivisita la dinamica storica della conoscenza 
economica alla luce di tale distinzione.
Daniele Schilirò
Candy V.J.: Signal Processing, The Model-Based Approach. 1986, New York-Hamburg, 
McGraw-Hill Company, pp. 240, DM. 126,70.
Il libro, svolto a livello piuttosto elevato, richiede una buona conoscenza dei processi 
stocastici nonché della teoria dei sistemi lineari, con particolare riferimento al problema dello 
spazio degli stati.
La parte fondamentale del testo riguarda i modelli relativi ai segnali: in questa area 
vengono utilizzati dei modelli stocastici molto noti, come i processi autoregressivi o a media 
mobile con input e anche i modelli dello spazio degli stati.
Il contenuto è articolato in sette capitoli più diverse appendici.
Il primo capitolo discute i concetti fondamentali sui modelli che riguardano i segnali e 
pone le basi per i successivi sviluppi. Viene esaminata con particolare attenzione la tecnica 
impiegata per rettificare (o adottare) la stima corrente, quando si dispone di un nuovo dato.
Nel capitolo secondo si discutono i modelli utilizzati per i processi stocastici: si esaminano 
prima alcuni processi particolari di tipo più elementare, per passare poi all’introduzione dei 
modelli ARMAX (autoregressivi e media mobile con input stocastico) e ai modelli dello spazio 
degli stati.
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La teoria della stima, il metodo della minima varianza, dei minimi quadrati e della 
massima verosimiglianza vengono sviluppati nel capitolo successivo.
Il capitolo quarto tratta gli aspetti teorici del filtro di Kalman, usando l’approccio basato 
sulla innovazione (innovation approach), utilizzando poi la teoria di Gauss-Markov e infine 
quella bayesiana.
Invece gli aspetti pratici dello stesso filtro sono studiati nel capitolo successivo (il quinto), 
mentre l’estensione della teoria del filtro di Kalman alla soluzione di problemi particolari viene 
esposta nel capitolo sesto. Qui vengono discussi alcuni esempi di simulazione, nonché stime 
non lineari ottenute con metodi di linearizzazione.
L ’ultimo capitolo è dedicato al filtro classico di Wiener e ai suoi legami con lo stimatore 
di Kalman. Il filtro di Wiener viene esaminato in termini dell’approccio innovativo e si mette 
cosi in evidenza come diverse tecniche di identificazione possono essere considerate come 
tecniche legate al filtro di Wiener.
Il libro termina con una vasta serie di appendici che spaziano da un breve riassunto sulle 
probabilità, all’analisi dello spazio degli stati, dall’inversione di matrici col metodo di suddivi­
sione della matrice stessa allo studio dei vettori casuali di tipo gaussiano, ad alcuni sofisticati 
programmi per calcolatori.
Si tratta, a nostro avviso, di un testo molto ben concepito, agevole da studiare anche per il 
contributo delle appendici sopra indicate che illustrano alcuni punti non sempre sviluppati nei 
testi che studiano questi argomenti.
Luigi Vajani
Alessandrini S., Secchi C : II ruolo delle trading company nel processo di internazionalizzazione
dell’economia italiana, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1986.
Il libro rappresenta la seconda tappa del lavoro svolto dal Gruppo di studio sui problemi 
del commercio estero, gruppo che opera dal 1978 nell’ambito del Cescom. Infatti dopo un 
quinquennio di ricerche sugli aspetti microeconomici del commercio estero, da cui è scaturito il 
volume della stessa collana “Gli operatori commerciali nel processo di internazionalizzazione 
dell’economia italiana”, l’attività del gruppo si è concentrata sul commercio internazionale di 
servizi (il riferimento d’obbligo è alle trading company) da cui prende l’avvio il seguente 
volume.
In esso si esamina come le tendenze attuali di competitività, protezionismo ed ostacoli vari 
al commercio mondiale rendano la vita più difficile alle attività di esportazione ed importazio­
ne. Si giustifica così la presenza delle trading company come unità funzionali indipendenti per 
il servizio al commercio di beni. Le trading company oltre alla funzione commerciale primaria 
infatti offrono servizi ausiliari e complementari che aumentano l’efficienza del commercio estero 
per il produttore.
Oltre alla relazione generale sullo stato del dibattito di S. Alessandrini, il volume presenta 
interessanti contributi che illustrano ruolo e potenzialità delle trading company: dall’esame del 
punto di vista pubblico, a quello bancario e parabancario; dal confronto con i consorzi export 
e con le piccole e medie imprese, al ruolo di sviluppo nella politica regionale; dal contesto 
di attività di servizio, alla internazionalizzazione e al confronto con le esperienze americane.
Nel complesso quindi un volume che fa luce efficacemente su tali problemi delle trading 
company utile per operatori e per il dibattito teorico.
F rancesco  P ren cipe
Italgas è qui.
Il metano più l'a zzu rro .
Dove c’è Italgas
ci sono tutti i vantaggi del metano.
Più quelli dell’azzurro.
Per significare l’insieme di servizi 
che solo una grande azienda 
a diffusione capillare può offrire. 
Italgas è tecnologia avanzata, 
esperienza; assistenza tecnica 
per il risparmio energetico. 
Metano Azzurro
definisce così un prodotto-servizio 
veramente integrato.
Che si debba metanizzare una città 
oppure riscaldare 









Nasce nel 1472 in Toscana la banca 
più antica del mondo: il Monte dei Paschi 
di Siena.
E cresce nei secoli dando credito al­
l’uomo. Al singolo uomo, alla sua intelli­
genza, creatività, fantasia. Alle comunità 
degli uomini, uniti in un progetto comu­
ne per inventare un ambiente e un futuro 
migliori.
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da cinque secoli, che da cinque secoli dà 
credito al futuro dell’uomo. Vivendo al 
suo fianco il tempo presente.
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